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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920139-CA 
v, : 
ANTHONY HARRIS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Anthony Harris appeals his convictions of 
theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404 (1990), and burglary, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This appeal involves a warrantless police entry into 
Michael Nichols' apartment no. 4B to seize Dexter Davis. After 
Davis was seized, the police conducted a protective sweep of the 
apartment and seized defendant. Stolen goods were in plain view 
and defendant was arrested. The issues raised on appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's 
motion to suppress the evidence seized from apartment 4B on the 
grounds that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless 
entry and that reasonable concerns for the officers' safety 
permitted the protective sweep? 
Whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless 
entry and whether a reasonable suspicion of danger supports a 
protective sweep are questions of fact. Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. 
Ct. 1093, 1095 (1990); State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 
App. 1991) (citing State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 
1987)). The trial court's factual findings must be affirmed on 
appeal unless clearly erroneous. Ibid. 
2. Does the state constitution require an officer to 
have probable cause to believe that danger to life or limb exists 
before the officei: may take protective measures? 
Whether a separate state constitutional standard is 
applicable is a question of law which is accorded no deference on 
appeal. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-66 (Utah 1990). 
When a defendant fails to assert a particular ground for 
suppression in the trial court, an appellate court will not 
consider that ground for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Schnoor, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 24 (Utah App. 1/7/93); State v. 
Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 150 (Utah App. 1991), cert, granted, No. 
910218 (Utah 2/5/93). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion to sever the Banana Republic charges from the 
Mr. Mac charges? 
A trial court's denial of a motion to sever will only 
be reversed if the refusal is "'a clear abuse of discretion in 
that it sacrifices the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair 
trial.'" State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114, 117 (Utah App.), cert. 
2 
denied, 843 P. 2d 1042 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Lopez, 789 
P.2d 39, 42 (Utah App. 1990)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The full text of any constitutional provisions, 
statutes or rules determinative of the outcome of this appeal are 
reproduced in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant and codefendants Michael Beavers, Michael 
Nichols and Terrence Flemmings were charged with burglaries and 
thefts at Banana Republic and Mr. Mac (R. 7-8, 23-24) (Addendum 
B). Nichols pled guilty to a third degree felony; Flemmings' 
charges were dismissed (R. 29, 897). Defendant and Beavers were 
bound over for trial (R. 26-29). 
Defendant and Beavers filed motions to suppress (R. 51, 
55-56). After an evidentiary hearing, only Beavers' initial 
statement to the police was suppressed; the motions were 
otherwise denied (R. 87, 91, 93, 101-08) (Addenda C & D). 
Defendant filed a motion to sever his trial from that 
of Beavers; the motion was granted (R. 220, 229-33, 234). 
Defendant then moved to sever the Banana Republic counts from the 
Mr. Mac charges; the motion was denied (R. 234, 530-32) (Addendum 
E). 
In October, 1991, Beavers was convicted after a jury 
trial of misdemeanor theft by receiving, burglary and felony 
theft (R. 244-45, 248-49, 352-56,). Defendant then entered 
conditional guilty pleas to second degree theft and third degree 
3 
burglary; the remaining charges were dismissed (R. 365, 367-73). 
Defendant was sentenced to the statutory terms of imprisonment to 
run concurrently with a prior prison sentence (R. 396, 398). 
Defendant and Beavers timely appealed (R. 384-85, 401). See 
State v. Beavers, No. 920056-CA (effectively treated as 
consolidated). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
During the early morning of November 12, 1990, a 
shopping cart was thrown through the front window of Banana 
Republic in Trolley Square (R. 830-31). The burglars attempted 
to take leather coats, but the coats were attached by chains to 
the wall and could not be removed (R. 832-33). Instead, 52 
canvass or cloth coats were stolen (R. 834). 
Within minutes, defendant, Beavers and Flemmings 
knocked on Michael Nichols' apartment door (no. 4B) (R. 804, 830, 
889, 1274). When Nichols opened the door, they brought in 
armfuls of coats which they said were stolen from Banana Republic 
(R. 890, 917). They "talked about going to some other store" (R. 
893). 
All four drove to a Mr. Mac store on Fort Union 
Boulevard (R. 813, 893-94). Beavers backed the car up to the 
store's front doors and pushed the doors in, breaking the bolt 
1
 The facts are taken from the evidentiary hearing on the 
joint motion to suppress. When necessary to explain the 
substantive offenses, the transcript of Beavers' trial has been 
cited. The trial occurred prior to the entry of defendant's pleas 
and defendant has cited to the Beavers' transcript in his brief. 
4 
lock (R. 814, 893-94). Defendant and Nichols grabbed 39 leather 
coats from a wall directly in front of the door (R. 806-08, 894). 
When Beavers drove out, he caught the left rear side of the car 
on the hanging doors and tore off part of the car's taillight (R. 
813-17). When they returned to Nichols' apartment, the Mr. Mac 
coats were hung with the Banana Republic coats (R. 895). Nichols 
left for work and the others stayed at the apartment (R. 895-96). 
Later that morning, David Hunt, the apartment manager, 
heard a loud argument coming from no. 4B (R. 1110-11). It 
"sounded like people were being hit in the apartment, like there 
was an assault occurring" (R. 1112). Someone said, "Don't kill 
me" (R. 1110). Hunt had not seen Nichols all morning, but he 
earlier had seen two black males go into the apartment (R. 1111, 
1120, 1147). Hunt was concerned because the night before two 
black males had "burglarized or broken into" the apartment and 
stolen a television (R. 1111, 1126, 1144). Hunt "felt one of the 
people he had seen [in the morning] was similar to the person the 
night before[,] but he wasn't [sic] positive" (R. 1111). Other 
than the two black males, Hunt did not know who was currently in 
no. 4B (R. 1120, 1147). 
Hunt called the police (R. 1110). When three officers 
responded, he told them that the argument was still going on, 
related what he had observed and heard, and gave the police the 
description and license number of the car which had dropped off 
the two males in the morning (R. 1110-12). 
The complex had three floors and no. 4B was in the 
5 
middle of the second floor (R. 1110). As the police came up the 
stairs, they could hear "male voices arguing inside the 
apartment" (R. 1112-13, 1149). Officer Foster remained in the 
stairwell while Officers Humphries and Beger approached no. 4B's 
door (R. 1113). The door was ajar two to three inches; "the 
doorjamb and latching mechanism were broken away[,] . . . the jam 
being splintered" (R. 1113). The officers did not know if the 
door had been kicked-in the night before in connection with the 
television theft or that morning during the assault (R. 1112, 
1128, 1152). 
Without announcing their presence, the officers stood 
on either side of the door (R. 1113, 1134). In Officer 
Humphries' view, "the argument that was occurring was violent 
enough in temperament that [he] felt [the officers] should 
ascertain as to exactly what was occurring" (R. 1148). Officers 
are trained to assess the nature of a disturbance or domestic 
dispute before intervening; otherwise if an officer simply 
announces his presence while a violent argument is occurring, the 
combatants' reaction may jeopardize the officers' safety (R. 
1148-49). 
The police listened outside the door for two to four 
minutes (R. 1113), They could hear two males arguing: 
The first individual was saying he wanted to 
take the coat, show the coat. "I will give 
you $10 and I will be back later." The other 
voice was objecting to that arrangement, was 
saying, "No, you are not leaving with the 
coat. I am not going to let you walk with 
the coat for $10." 
6 
( I1"11! i III mi i i II n i l i II t i n t e . j j e c t e d : 
They have got a lot of coats in there. You 
have seen the coats they have in there. 
(.Id.)' The rirst male responded: 
Wei! 1 am leaving, 1 will see y°11 later. 
I I d |i I ' i I I I l:li in II , l luexli f M Dtiiu'i , <i l i h n l . iiiiii i II i , i I i j p p e d t h n nm fh I IK" 
d o o r w a y into the complex's hallway (V I J I 4j He was wearing a 
leather jacket and carryinq another tan iaeket with store lags on 
i. hlnru hanger | II I I I "II "| M h i iMiu i H e p p e d nl nl M M 
apartment, he turned and saw the uniformed officers | h .1115). 
He said 'iih shit," ami "started to rtep back into the 
apartment1 (III' 1 I J 4 J ', \ Liiticer Hunipluius xedi.Iied I h i oui|h I lit1 
open door and grabbed Davis-' l»y the shoulder, flipping his feet 
i mil 1 i i mi iIIIIII Hi i 1 i I I II II II I I  llii, II I I ' in . 
A6 boon cis Davis started back through the dour, uiiicer 
Humphries could see into the living room, He knew thai the 
2
 Officer Humphries testified that when he first observed 
Davis he could identify the tags and hanger as Banana Republic's 
(R. 1114/ 1131). The court questioned whether the officer could 
make this connection during the few seconds he saw Davis before 
seizing him; the court voiced that it was more probable that after 
the officer entered the apartment and saw the stolen coats, he made 
the connection to the Banana Republic burglary which the officer 
knew about before coming to the apartment; the prosecutor agreed 
(R. 478-80, 544). 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the court did not dispute 
that Officer Humphries saw the tags and hanger and, therefore, 
could reasonably discern that the coat was "contraband." The 
officer consistently testified that he could observe store tags and 
a store-type hanger (R. 1114, 1117, 1131). He also testified that 
based on his undercover experience in fencing operations, it was 
his bc*lief that the argument was over stolen coats (R, 11 17, 11 ] 9 ) . 
The court did not question this testimony; it only questioned 
whether, prior to seizing Davis, the officer could identify the 
s o ii r c e o £ t h e s t o J e n c o a t. 
7 
tenant of no. 4B was a white male, but the only persons he could 
see were two black males, later identified as defendant and 
Flemmings, and a female black juvenile, Deandra Hurd (R. 1024-25, 
1111, 1115-16, 1146-47). Defendant ran out of view towards the 
back of the apartment (R. 1116). Flemmings began fumbling with a 
pile of clothing on the floor (R. 1115-16). Officer Humphries 
called to Officer Foster and the two entered the apartment with 
guns drawn as Officer Beger secured Davis on the floor (R. 1119). 
Flemmings and Hurd were then ordered to the floor and Humphries 
seized defendant (R. 1116). Officer Humphries quickly made a 
cursory check of the rest of the apartment to determine if anyone 
else was inside (R. 1120). In plain view were the stolen coats 
(R. 103, 106, 1120-21).3 
After providing the warnings required by Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), defendant was 
questioned (R. 1047-48, 1053, 1056). He admitted his involvement 
in the Mr. Mac burglary, claimed that he knew about the Banana 
Republic stolen coats only after the fact, and implicated Beavers 
in both crimes (R. 1049-51, 1068-75). When questioned the next 
day, defendant repeated his confession (R. 1076-77). 
At the same time, the police located the Mazda used in 
the Mr. Mac burglary behind the apartment. It was missing a 
taillight similar to the one found inside Mr. Mac (R. 798, 823-
24). Karen Hull, the car's owner, walked up and explained that 
3
 A search warrant was subsequently secured; the trial court 
found that no property search took place before execution of the 
warrant (R. 103, 106, 478-79, 552-53). 
8 
she had reported the car stolen; she said Beavers had stolen the 
k e y b I! „ 1 j e 111 y II 11 ill.) e I* c 11: • t- i w 111 l„ H H 11 H vi i' 11 •. 1111„ o ,x, m c a t e t i a il 11 p ifi i • 1;,'", • | II<«", 
J 17B»79, 1161-83). Beavers was subsequently arrested. 
At Beavers' trial, Nichols testified for the State, 
( I"!" , "J I I • "ill ) , o n „•'" moil L In a 1.1 e i IBoavei AM hi i o'ir ' 11 "I ehl,, d e l eml r i i r l . 
entered his conditional guilty pleas {U, Id'i '16 7-7 3) . 
SUMMARY UF ARGUMENT 
A. Search and Seizure i s s u es 
The issue raised in thif appeal is whether the 
warrantless entry into apartment 4P t.n seize Dexter Davis w^s 
j us t J tied , I I tlie police were not lawtuJl\ on I he premises, the 
contemporaneous protective sweep of the apai'tment was not proper 
.riiiii!') II, I i UP p l a i n v il o w nifier in 1 I O i l i l o ,' i in c t h e F - e 
observations created the probable oaiiou loi Lht subbequenl search 
warrant, invalid], ty of the observations would mandate suppression 
ol I. In.) properly senz-eil put M.iiiiil In I In wen iriinl nn I In nl her 
hand, as defendant conceded below, it the eritiy is valid, I he 
subsequent police action at the apartment is constitutionally 
perini tisible. 
Determination of whether the warrantless entry i nto 
apartment 4B is constitutional permissible does /, - expand 
ex J s t urnif i o n iirl lhi ftirierKJiiiHirl lav m .• :•• -• - , 
tlie r e s o l u t i o n i s f a c t u a l : Wai •  * w a r r a n t l e s s - r : - • r - i* 
Dexter Davis j u s t i f i e d by the oxigencie? 4 * ^ - . - e 
I 11 - e s L l g a L 1 u11 11 il 11 I 11 11 I I 11 i 11 I  o e q u e i . 
by a r e a s o n a b l e b e l i e f t h a t the occupants : * - a ia / t . r e r* 
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presented a danger to the officers or others? 
The police were legitimately investigating an assault 
in progress when they became aware that the suspected 
participants were also engaged in fencing stolen property. It is 
uncontested that the police had a reasonable basis to stop and 
question Davis; a closer question is whether they had probable 
cause for his arrest. But whether the police had reasonable 
suspicion for a temporary detention or probable cause for a full 
arrest is not controlling; for in either case, the police had the 
right to seize Davis. The issue is whether the police could 
effectuate that seizure by reaching into the apartment. 
The trial court properly found that the exigencies of 
the field investigation justified the warrantless entry. The 
apartment had been burglarized the night before; a person 
resembling one of the "burglars" had returned in the morning and 
was still in the apartment. Sounds of someone being assaulted 
and responding, "Don't kill me," had been reported. The lawful 
tenant of the apartment had not been seen. The door to the 
apartment appeared kicked-in and a loud argument was still 
occurring. These investigations had not been resolved when Davis 
stepped through the door, saw the police, reacted by saying, "Oh 
shit," and attempted to retreat into the apartment. The trial 
court correctly found that under these circumstances, allowing 
Davis to retreat into the apartment created greater danger to 
those at the scene. 
10 
When Davis retreated through the door, the other 
occupants became aware of the police and responded: one began 
l i u i i l i J l i n y W i l l i , in 1 I"1!!!,!1"" mi 1 I iii'11 I: II, 11 i I l i f 11 III ii! • i i / d i i II i j i" I l i e in i i in I MI t h e 
apartment and out of police view, The trial court properly found 
that the officers reasonably viewed these actions ap present: inq a 
danger In Iheii safety and, tui lint ludtnii, we,ie justifiMl III 
conducting a limited protective sweep of 1 he* premises to secure 
ci" lpants . 
Defendant argues for the lust I i in*-- on appeal fliniil the 
proper standard to judge a protective sweep under the state 
ronsl iitujfioii II. whittle i tin1 utl ICPI s limrl probable cause t.n 
believe that they were in dangei . Vh,\u JI-I contrary to federal 
and Utah case law which have consistently allowed protective 
sweep's when i > I f ice;i::i;fi reafionab'l y be 1 i ••»< i-i I I In • |/ *?< MI C III n d a r n n"1 r , 
Further, since defendant did not challenge the level oi certainty 
needed for a protective sweep below, the issue is waived inr 
P in ii" poses of rtppert I . 
1 - Severance Issue 
Defendant pr^sum*-? * '' ••-^ •••t i^nai c . . , :v t . eas 
• • - • > 
sever, But asjno a Serv conditioic , <- •-:.*?'•: ;&£«..eH /r'^e 
- ••r+--i amendmer ontext • *• improper Preservai , 
| , • *i ,- + • y 
plea must be limite. those cases whir . ^ imatei, u 
the admissibility ?hallencred evidence?, . . . 
inadmissi WOUIG 
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prosecution. Resolution of a denial of a severance motion 
involves complex considerations of the admissibility of other 
crimes evidence and the balancing of any prejudicial impact to 
defendant. For these reasons, appellate review of a denial of 
severance cannot properly be undertaken in the context of a 
guilty plea but must be viewed in light of trial evidence. 
Should this Court nevertheless consider the merits of 
defendant's argument, prejudice for purposes of vacating an 
otherwise voluntary guilty plea occurs only when a defendant can 
establish that but for the ruling of the court, the defendant 
would have insisted upon proceeding to trial. Under this 
standard, defendant has failed to establish prejudice. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE 
WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO APARTMENT 4B WAS 
JUSTIFIED BY EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT 
LEGITIMATE CONCERNS FOR SAFETY PERMITTED A 
PROTECTIVE SWEEP; THEREFORE, THE STOLEN 
PROPERTY WAS LAWFULLY OBSERVED IN PLAIN VIEW. 
The denial of defendant's motion to suppress the 
evidence seized from apartment 4B is consistent with established 
law. The warrant requirement of the fourth amendment renders a 
warrantless entry and search of a home per se unreasonable, State 
v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (citing Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 358, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967)), and 
mandates a warrant to enter a home to effectuate a routine 
arrest, Pavton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 
1374-75 (1980); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213-14, 
101 S. Ct. 1642, 1648 (1981). But when the police are faced with 
12 
exigent circumstances demanding .immediate action, the federal and 
Pavton, Steaqald, Ashe, id . ; State v. Larocco, 3 9 1 IE 2d 460 « I ; '0 
(Utah 1990). For this reason , the trial court properly concluded 
Thib appeal i Iiallenges the app.1 :i cation ot only one 
subcategory of the exigent circumstances doctrine: a warrantless 
e n t !"y i inl i i-1 illlii nil Il n ,sfj" i z e a per son wh i cf\ i s inec e s s I t a l pel II iy M 
risk of injury or harm to other persons present at the scene, 
The exception is base rl on a different ratnonaje than in a 
wa r r a n 11, e s s s ea re hi t n ir pr o'pe v f y I i, ha Vr\ v e Search and 
Seizure,, § 6 . lf) ( cl ) (1987) In the latter, the exigent 
circumstances doctrine permits a warrantless search on the basis 
t hat PV" iriencr i* ,i I, I hfc i.lostroyerl ,i removeil b e f o r e a v u-u rant ri.in 
be secured. Larocco, 7 94 P. 2d at 4/0; Ashe, 745 P. 2d at J 258 
n.10. 
i1 in in ir "I i HI pi i II J i i i i j i at, i o i id ,11 €" iincJfM J i «-;• t) I In-' ,< riteiU, 
exception to the warrant requirement: 
[T|he business of policemen . . . Is to act, 
There is no evidence that defendant. ;,avj a .ecs;r;a; . e 
expectation of privacy in apartment 4B sufficient to challenge * - e 
warrantless entry. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 14 3 9° S. Ct. 
421. 430 (1978); Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct 1684, 1688 (1990). 
However,- the trial prosecutor conceded t '.a:. defendant had 
"standing" to contest the entry (R. 1096). On appeal, the State is 
bound by the prosecutor's factual concessions. Steaqald, 451 U.S. 
at 208-09. But see State v. Marshall, 791 P. 2d 880, 887 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (on appeal, State 
challenged defendant's expectation of privacy in the searched 
premises as an alternative grounds for affirmance; trial prosecutor 
had failed to raise the legal argument but had made no factua 1 
concession that defendant had p^ expectation of privacy)• 
13 
not to speculate or meditate on whether [a 
report of an emergency] is correct. People 
could well die in emergencies if police tried 
to act with the calm deliberation associated 
with the judicial process. 
Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963) 
(emphasis in original). Accord State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 
103, 105 (Utah 1980) (officers not only have the right but the 
duty to respond to suspicious activity). For this reason, 
M[t]he need to protect or preserve life or 
avoid serious injury is justification for 
what would be otherwise illegal absent an 
exigency or emergency." 
Mincev v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 393, 392, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2413 (1978) 
(quoting Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212). Accord Provo City v. Warden, 
844 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah App. 1992) (adopting "imminent danger to 
life or limb" criteria to justify community caretaker automobile 
stop). Recognition that seizures of persons, as opposed to 
property, create special risks to law enforcement underlies the 
permissibility of all protective police measures. Warden v. 
Havden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1646 (1967) 
(recognizing "hot pursuit" exception to warrant requirement); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (1968) 
(frisks for weapons permissible); State v. Beloard, 840 P.2d 819, 
822 (Utah App. 1992) (officer's safety justifies warrantless 
entry); State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 731-32 (Utah App. 1992) 
(weapons search permissible for officer's safety); State v. 
Stricklino, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 69, 70-71 (Utah App. 12/3/92) 
(weapons search permissible in traffic stop); State v. Carter, 
707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985) (pat down during investigative stop 
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permi ssible) . 
In this appeal, the question is whether the exigencies 
11II II Inn I  in i II i II i in *»»• t i y r i i 11 in i n 1 I i f 11 p i l I I n i M i II I M I i P t H h i n q i in t ) 
apai Linen L 4B to seize and detain Dexter Davis Resolution is 
two-told; first, did 1 ho polire have a legitimate basis to seize 
i i i i i i II d i d a i r i 1 Mi i '• - m i d i n omu l t ill in i II I ln» t \ h 11 in'iiH i t " () II I I n 
circiiirts Lance fa permit this seizure to be accomplished b\ a dn 
minimis entry into the apartment7 The issues are factual, the 
t i J ri II i o u t I i i J I K J J I I L I ' - I IIIUII ill I n | i v i m i|r f p i e n c h m i 11 f n j t i l IIIIII I 
af f i rmed u n l e s s c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s ' I . i Lc v, Chapman» 841 I ?d n t 
7 ? 7 ? S t a t e v , Dorsev, Ml V ?\i }[)Hl\ HtBfl | III id 198M? S t a t e v . 
M o r e } , „ h , 1 II II M 1 1 M , II II 'I II | IIIIII i l l M | > | II "t I l l I I I I H | A b h e , " i E> 
I ,?d at 1258); State v. Belqard, 840 P 2d at B22. 
A, The Police Had a Reasonable Basis to 
Seize and Detain Davis. 
T i l l I II I I I I I IIIIII II 1 I I i l l l l i l I I l * I \ | = RI" II 7 Hi I T ' 1 l i I n V r l i I i II b i l l II 
did not articulate whether it v i ewed 1 lie ueizuie as a lev* I tw 
temporary detention or a level three arrest (H, 102 105, 'Vilj 
I Addenda l I" I i | o£ hLdU.„v, beiliiidu , '"'l I 'ill h I I I'• I 
(Utah 1 9 8 7 ) , 'line d i s t i n c t i o n between ii ilniiipoiaiy d e t e n t 11 un and 
an a i r e s t i s not c o n t r o l l e d by t h e d e g r e e oJ i o r c e used b e c a u s e 
mi III I i il hi.11 en 11 I In " |n i ni HI in [ i i in i'.Hi I iii in I IIIIII i I I in i I 11 I * ii I 
Terry . 392 II ', at Id, IIII !., LI ii 1 1BU; Uni ted S t a t e s v , 
M e r r i t t , 695 V, ?d I ?h i{ l / ' 4 ( l i l t t i I ' IT IMH'l* S t a t e v. T r u i i l l o , 
" J i l I J11 LI L i , 111 i1 1 I I I iiiiii .1 ! | i " | " IIIMII ' 1 II i M I 0(11(11, II I n i l e q i \a n l 
certainty of criminality dictates the scope oL detention 
permissible. State v. Hicrains, HJi p.2d D, 11 (Utah App. 199 2j 
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(citing Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 
1325 (1983)). 
To temporarily detain a person, the officer must have 
objective facts that "would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
the subject had committed or was about to commit a crime." 
Chapman, 841 P.2d at 727. Accord Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) 
(Addendum A). The facts should not be judged in isolation but 
must be considered as a whole. Stricklina, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
70. The officer's experience and training is also a factor. 
State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 n.2 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987) . 
Here, the officers were called to the scene to 
investigate an assault in progress (R. 1110, 1145). Defendant 
characterizes this as only a simple assault, relying on Officer 
Humphries' statement that officers were not placed behind the 
apartment building because he "was not terribly concerned about 
people jumping out the second story over a simple assault" (R. 
1145-46). But this response is not indicative of Officer 
Humphries' characterization of the nature of the investigation. 
Officer Humphries testified that the argument he overheard was 
"violent in temperament" (R. 1148-49). Because of his concerns 
for the nature of the altercation, he posted officers in the 
stairwell and on either side of the door as protective measures 
(jLd.). Defendant's assertion that Officer Humphries became 
placated when he overheard only a verbal argument is incorrect. 
The officer stated that when the verbal argument continued 
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without sounds of a physical assauJ tk lie b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e v i c t im 
iiidV lumen I'llrpady bpoii HPMIHIFIIV i in in iff 11 m i n c a p a c i t a t e d --'-'* u on 
Hunt s r e p o r t t hd i soineone s a i u , uuu t h i i i mc, WUIJJ 1 
s t r u c k | lb" 11 4B ) . The t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y found t h e a s s a u l t 
i im-M.i^ci! mil I I i III |n i in | M I ip l^iiil I«i I 1 v 'Iflrn-iPrriis I K • i u ^ , 
I lib, 551 ) (Addenda C h L)) . 
I t i s uncon t " r eve r t ed t h a t Hunt t o l d t h e p o l i c e t h a t one 
Il I I! in I Hi II MI Ill' iiiiiiLi II i - \ i III II II in i p a i I m e r i t 1 r i n k H I I II i I M P II 11 m« | ne i s o n M I I M 
had 'burglarized ot broken into" the apartment Llie night betoit. 
and stolen a television (R. 1111, I I ?f , i i 4 4 i Whi Le the court 
i J if I mi in 111 e 1111-> in a I 11 1 iiiii'i 1 f i n 11 i i in 11 111 in I I in i 1 1 in II111 in 11 1 1 1 in in i I i ^  111 i in 1 I 7 
credited it " l-1 V" I1 (Addenduii1 i1), Hunt h information, coupled 
with the broken door, provided reasonable suspicion of a 
r e s i d e n t i a J I m i y I ii i ) rillii bun i ij I a i ) yi i . ihi.t iiiin I f i oni Lln« Ha 
R e p u b i i c b u r g l a r y ; it i s t h e I a 1 t e r b u r g 1 a r y wli i c h t. lie t.i 111 I 
conit found was not being investiqated prior to Davis' seizure 
I k, Vnl-bJ) 
Prior to Davis stepping Into the hallway, there was 
»*?ri^  MHhln •" {-'I'M'i II i i |i | J i Hi -I r'tip. iiirt s ol the apartment 
possessing stolen property (thelt. ), Again, the court did in .)t 
specifically address this investigation but did not question time 
LII.JI ii y I i mi I Ii i I I mi I  rim i i ) mi I  111 (iii t • '" O f f i c e r H u m p h r i e s , wiLli 
•' O n l y t h e S t a t e p r e s e n t e d w i t n e s s e s d u r i n g the hearing on the 
motion to suppress and their testimony was uncontroverted. The 
court implicitly found the officer's testimony credible except in 
the one instance where the court questioned whether the officer 
consciously made a connection to the Banana Republic rurglary 
before entering the apartment. ( See footnote 2 *• ;• :--mplete 
discussion.) 
17 
two years of experience in fencing operations, concluded that the 
argument in the apartment concerned fencing (R. 1118-19). 
Defendant attempts to discredit the officer's belief by asserting 
that the overheard argument was equally consistent with 
innocence; this assertion is meritless in light of the 
surrounding circumstances. Accord Stricklinq, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 70; Chapman, 841 P.2d at 728 (innocent explanation for each 
fact in isolation is overcome by consideration of totality of 
facts to establish reasonable suspicion). A burglary and theft 
had been reported as occurring at the apartment the night before; 
one of the suspects was in the apartment and was present during a 
reported physical assault; the door was kicked-in; three males 
were loudly arguing over a coat which one wanted to take for 
$10.00 to "show" and "a lot" of similar coats were in the 
apartment (see Statement of Facts at 6-7). Accord State v. 
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah App. 1990) (defendant's removal of 
item from underneath clothing and placing item in sack while 
standing in front of retail store provided reasonable suspicion 
of shoplifting). 
Defendant admits that the police had reasonable 
suspicion to detain Davis outside the apartment, yet 
inconsistently claims that the only reason the police seized him 
was because he retreated into the apartment. This is contrary to 
Officer Humphries' testimony. The officer stated that he seized 
Davis because of the on-going assault investigation coupled with 
the officer's belief that the coat Davis possessed was contraband 
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(R. 1117-18)• When Davis observed the uniformed officers, said, 
"Oh shit," and retreated into the apartment, Officer Humphries 
reasonably believed that Davis was attempting to evade the police 
because of his present criminal involvement (R. 1115, 1141-42), 
The negative verbal response coupled with the immediate retreat 
was not ambiguous; rather, it was indicative of Davis' 
recognition that he had been "caught," While flight alone may 
not be an indicator of guilt, flight coupled with "other indicia 
of criminality" can establish reasonable suspicion. Compare 
State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1990) (alone, the 
act of avoiding a roadblock does not establish reasonable 
suspicion), with State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1134 n.l (Utah 
App. 1991) (flight may be considered with other facts to 
determine reasonableness of seizure), and State v. Elliott, 626 
P.2d 423, 427 (Utah 1981) (flight may elevate reasonable 
suspicion to the level of probable cause). 
Here, the action of flight coupled with the other 
objective facts provided more than reasonable suspicion to detain 
Davis; taken as a whole, the facts provided probable cause for 
arrest. Ramirez 814 P.2d at 1134 n.l; Elliot, 626 P.2d at 427. 
See also California v. Hodari P., Ill S. Ct. 1547, 1549 (1991); 
Sibron (Peters^ v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 
1904) (1968) ("deliberately furtive actions and flight at the 
approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens 
rea and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the 
officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are 
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proper factors"). Probable cause exists when 
from the facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences which fairly might be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in 
his position would be justified in believing 
that the suspect had committed the offense. 
Rocha, 600 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah 1979). The officer "need not have 
'certain knowledge of the guilt of the suspect.'" State v. 
Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988) (citation omitted). 
Instead, 
[a] valid arrest occurs whenever "a crime 
under which the arrest is made and a crime 
for which probable cause exists are in some 
fashion related. . ." 
Id. (citation omitted). 
As previously discussed, the trial court did not 
articulate if it had found reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
to support Davis' seizure. However, this Court may consider any 
alternative grounds for affirmance where the underlying facts are 
necessarily established by the record. State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 1991); State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 
1316 (Utah 1986). Here, the police had reasonable suspicion to 
investigate an assault, a residential burglary and fencing or 
possession of stolen property. The first two investigations were 
based on Hunt's information and corroboration was obtained when 
the police went to the second floor. They observed the kicked-in 
front door which supported a forcible entry in connection with 
either the burglary or the assault; they heard the occupants of 
the apartment engaged in a loud and "violent" argument; and based 
on the officer's experience, he believed the argument was about 
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stolen property. These observations provided increasing indicia 
of criminality. 
The officers also knew that the potential suspect in 
the burglary was a black male, the missing tenant of the 
apartment was a white male, and the assault and arguments began 
only after the black males had returned to the apartment in the 
morning (see Statement of Facts at 5). The police then observed 
Davis, a black male, exit the apartment. He was wearing a coat 
and carried what appeared to be a stolen coat on a hanger. When 
he saw the police, he made a negative exclamation and attempted 
to retreat. In light of these circumstances, a reasonable and 
prudent officer would be justified in believing that Davis was 
involved in theft by receiving. Accord State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 
902, 904 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (1990); 
State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Utah 1985) (a defendant may 
be convicted of theft by receiving even if the property is not in 
fact stolen if the defendant acted under the belief that the 
property was stolen). It was not necessary for the police to 
verify the source of the suspected stolen property before acting. 
Morck, 821 P.2d at 1193 (probable cause only requires the 
"probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal 
activity") (citation omitted); Rocha, 600 P.2d at 545 (arrest 
standard does not require an Habsolutely certain judgment" before 
the police act). 
Finally, a basis existed to detain Davis apart from his 
possession of contraband: Davis was present in the apartment when 
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the assault was reported to have occurred and during the ensuing 
argument over stolen property. 
"Where a crime may have been committed and a 
suspect or important witness is about to 
disappear, it seems irrational to deprive the 
officer of the opportunity to 'freeze' the 
situation for a short time, so that he may 
make inquiry and arrive at a considered 
judgment about further action to be taken* 
To deny the police such a power would be to 
pay a high price in effective policing and in 
the police's respect for the good sense of 
the rules that govern them." 
Watkins v. State, 420 A.2d 270, 274 (Md. App. 1980) (quoting ALI, 
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 110.2 at 272). Until 
the officers could determine the whereabouts of the lawful tenant 
and/or the safety of the occupants, they had the duty to "freeze" 
the situation by preventing witnesses or suspects from leaving 
the scene. 
B. The De Minimis Entry into the Apartment 
to Seize Davis Was Justified by Exigent 
Circumstances. 
Having implicitly found a lawful basis for the seizure, 
the trial court ruled that: (1) reaching into the apartment to 
grab Davis was an entry; and (2) the entry was justified by the 
dangerousness of the situation (R. 102, 105, 551) (Addendum D). 
While dispute exists, the better view is that whether 
an entry has occurred is controlled by the location of the person 
seized and not the location of the officer. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure. § 6.1(e). An overly analytical approach is, however, 
disfavored; fourth amendment issues should not be determined by 
"metaphysical subtleties." Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 
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89 S. Ct. 1420, 1425 (1969). Instead, where an officer "merely 
reaches in to manifest the fact of arrest, such a de minimus 
breaking of the vertical plane above the threshold should not 
itself make the warrantless arrest unlawful; otherwise the 
legality of doorway arrests would have to be determined by resort 
to plum bob and quaint distinctions drawn from the 'entry' 
ingredient of common law burglary," LaFave, Search and Seizure, 
§ 6.1(5) at 590-91. But see Pavton, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S. Ct. 
at 1382 ("The fourth amendment has drawn a firm line at the 
entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that 
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant."). 
For purposes of argument, the State assumes a de minimis entry 
was made when the officer reached in and seized Davis. 
Defendant asserts that unless the entry was supported 
by probable cause to arrest, the exigent circumstances doctrine 
is inapplicable. Defendant, further, argues that even if the 
doctrine is applicable, no exigencies existed. Both contentions 
are incorrect. 
1. Applicability of the Exigent Circumstances Doctrine. 
The exigent circumstances doctrine is traditionally 
predicated on probable cause in the sense that a warrantless 
search may occur where there is probable cause to believe that 
the place searched contains the object of the search and exigent 
circumstances justify the failure to obtain a warrant. Larocco, 
794 P.2d at 467-68. Similarly, if there is probable cause to 
arrest, the police may make a warrantless entry to effectuate the 
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arrest where exigent circumstances exist which would eliminate 
the reasonable opportunity to secure a warrant without creating 
danger to the police or others. United States v. Santana, 427 
U.S. 43, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 2409 (1976); State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 
at, 1134. The doctrine, however, does not mandate that the 
officers have probable cause to arrest plus probable cause to 
search plus exigent circumstances before acting; yet, this is 
what defendant effectively argues. 
The warrant requirement is founded on the premise that 
a person's home should be "free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion." Pavton, 455 U.S. at 590, 100 S. Ct. at 1382. 
"Differences in the intrusiveness of entries to search and 
entries to arrest are merely ones of degree rather than kind. 
The two intrusions share this fundamental characteristic; the 
breach of the entrance to an individual's home." id. at 589, at 
1381. 
However, while an arrest warrant and a search 
warrant both serve to subject the probable-
cause determination of the police to judicial 
review, the interests protected by the two 
warrants differ. An arrest warrant is issued 
by a magistrate upon a showing that probable 
cause exists to believe that the subject of 
the warrant has committed an offense and thus 
the warrant primarily serves to protect an 
individual from an unreasonable seizure. A 
search warrant, in contrast, is issued upon a 
showing of probable cause to believe that the 
legitimate object of a search is located in a 
particular place, and therefore safeguards an 
individual's interest in the privacy of his 
home and possessions against the unjustified 
intrusion of the police. 
Steaqald, 451 U.S. at 212-213, 101 S. Ct. at 1648. 
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Davis was seized in a third-party's home, therefore, 
the constitutional interests to be protected are: (1) Davis' 
right to be protected against an unreasonable seizure regardless 
of the location; and (2) the "homeowner's"6 right to be 
protected against an unreasonable intrusion. 
Turning to Davis' interest, the constitution does not 
protect what is exposed to public view: by carrying the stolen 
coat into the public hallway, Davis diminished any expectation of 
privacy in protecting observations of himself or his possessions. 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 350, 88 S. Ct. at 516; State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 
48, 51 (Utah 1981). Where the police have a lawful basis to 
seize a person, that person cannot evade the seizure by 
retreating inside a home. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43, 96 U.S. at 
2409-10 (recognizing "hot pursuit" doctrine); Ramirez, 814 P.2d 
at 1135 (exigent circumstances justify seizure of misdemeanant in 
home); State v. Hamilton, 710 P.2d 174, 175 (Utah 1985) ("hot 
pursuit" doctrine applicable to traffic offense of failing to 
yield the right of way). A defendant "cannot reduce a legitimate 
arrest attempt to a game of 'tag' by reaching 'home' a few steps 
ahead of the police." Ramirez, 814 P.2d at 1135. 
The cases cited are typical of the majority of exigent 
circumstance seizure cases: either the trial court found probable 
cause for the seizure or the appellate courts elevate the trial 
6
 Homeowner is used to connote anyone with an expectation of 
privacy in the premises sufficient to challenge the entry. The 
trial prosecutor conceded that defendant had an expectation of 
privacy in the home. See footnote 4. 
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court's finding of reasonable suspicion to probable cause based 
on the defendant's flight from the attempted stop* Compare 
Edwards v. United States (Edwards I). 364 A.2d 1209, 1214 (D.C. 
App, 1976) (in effectuating a Terry stop, police may follow 
fleeing suspect into home), with Edwards v. United States 
(Edwards m , 379 A.2d 976, 978 (D.C. App. 1979) (rehearing en 
banc) (facts support probable cause for arrest; no discussion of 
validity of original panel decision that entry was permissible to 
effectuate Terry detention). See also Ramirez, 814 P.2d at 1135 
n.3 (finding probable cause for arrest and noting that court was 
not deciding if a home entry could be predicated on reasonable 
suspicion); State v. Flowers, 789 P.2d 333, 338 (Wash. App. 1990) 
(commenting that court need not decide if police actions were 
also justified on reasonable suspicion and exigent circumstances 
since court found probable cause to arrest). 
The few jurisdictions that have directly addressed the 
issue have concluded that an warrantless entry for the purpose of 
effectuating a level two seizure is not per se unreasonable if 
otherwise justified by exigent circumstances. People v. Rivera, 
598 N.E.2d 423, 427 (111. App. 1992); United States v. Pace, 898 
F.2d 1218, 1228-29 (7th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, Cialoni v. 
U.S., 110 S. Ct. 3286 (1990); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 421 A.2d 
721, 724-25 (Penn. Super. 1980). See also Oregon v. Davis, 666 
P.2d 802, 812 (Oregon 1983) (finding no exigent circumstances to 
justify entry but recognizing that doctrine may permit an entry 
supported by less than probable cause). 
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Implicit in these decisions is the recognition that 
since the fourth amendment permits an officer to follow a fleeing 
arrestee into a home to effectuate an arrest, Santana, 427 U.S. 
at 43, 96 S. Ct. at 2410, there is no logical reason for a 
different result simply because the basis for the seizure is 
predicated on reasonable suspicion. LaFave, Search and Seizure, 
§ 9.2(d) at 369-70. The level of "reasonableness" to support the 
seizure will dictate the length and scope of detention, but it is 
the probable cause to believe that the suspect is in the place to 
be searched which supports the entry. Compare Pavton, 445 U.S. 
at 589-91, 100 S. Ct. at 1381-83, with Steaaald, 451 U.S. at 212-
215, 101 S. Ct. at 1647-49. For this reason, the police do not 
need to simply walk away from an incomplete Terry stop but may 
follow the fleeing suspect into a private home under the same 
limited circumstances that they may follow a fleeing arrestee. 
Edwards I, 364 A.2d at 1214 (reasoning cited with approval by 
LaFave, .id.)* Just as Santana, Pavton, and Steaqald limit 
entries made for purposes of arrest, 
the police, in certain limited circumstances, 
may be authorized to make a warrantless entry 
into a private premises for the purpose of 
effectuating a Terry stop provided the police 
have a lawful basis to stop a suspect in a 
public place and the suspect reacts by 
suddenly fleeing to a private sanctuary, 
thereby thwarting any opportunity to conduct 
the detention at a public place. 
Rivera, 598 N.E.2d at 427. Accord Pace, 898 F.2d at 1228-29 
(distinguishing Pavton on grounds that it involved only a routine 
arrest and applying exigent circumstances doctrine to justify 
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entry into private garage to effectuate a temporary detention); 
Daniels, 421 A.2d at 724-25 (recognizing "intermediate response" 
permitting an exigent warrantless entry for the limited purpose 
of questioning occupants pursuant to Terry where no probable 
cause for arrest). See also Servis v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 
156, 162 (Va. App. 1988) (permitting officers to take protective 
actions when making Terry type seizures in a home on the basis 
the "dangerousness" of a suspect remains the same whether 
arrested or temporarily seized and no matter on which "side of 
the threshold the defendant is standing") (citations omitted). 
Similarly, the "homeowner's" constitutional interest 
was not affected by whether the police had reasonable suspicion 
or probable cause for Davis' seizure. For even if the police had 
an arrest warrant for Davis, they could not have entered Nichols' 
apartment without a search warrant absent exigent circumstances. 
Steaaald, 451 U.S. at 213 101 S. Ct. at 1648. It is the probable 
cause to believe that the object of the search is in the third-
party home which protects the homeowner from impermissible 
generalized searches. JEd.. at 215, at 1649. Here, the police had 
probable cause to believe that Davis was in the home; he was 
standing right at the door. Thus, this case is most similar to 
"hot pursuit" cases, which since common law have permitted 
forcible entries into homes to effectuate the seizure of a 
fleeing suspect. .Id. at 218-19, at 1651. Accord Ramirez, 814 
P.2d at 1134. 
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2. Existence of Exigent Circumstances. 
Whether exigent circumstances exist is question of 
fact: Under the totality of the circumstances, would the 
procurement of a warrant have jeopardized the safety of the 
officers or others at the scene? Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470; Ashe, 
745 P.2d at 1258. Judicial hindsight is not the test; rather, 
consideration must be given for the officer's reasonable concerns 
for safety and the spilt-second nature of their decisions during 
evolving field investigations. Ramirez, 814 P.2d at 1136. 
Factors generally considered are: (1) the nature of the 
offense under investigation, including whether it is a violent 
offense; (2) reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed or 
dangerous; (3) the trustworthiness of the information that the 
suspect has or is committing an offense; (4) the strength of the 
belief that the suspect is on the premises; (5) the likelihood of 
the suspect escaping if not quickly apprehended; and (6) the 
nature of the entry made. Flowers, 789 P.2d 338 (citing Dorman 
v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). Other relevant 
factors are: (7) whether the officers were in hot pursuit of a 
fleeing suspect; and (8) whether the seizure was planned or 
unplanned. Flowers, id. (citations omitted). See also LaFave, 
Search and Seizure, § 6.1(f) at 598-601. 
The trial court found that the officers were faced with 
a "very dangerous scenario" (R. 647). The police had received 
"very certain information" that the apartment had been broken 
into the night before and that an assault was now "in progress"; 
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a person inside the apartment had said, "Don't kill me," and the 
apartment's front door was broken and appeared kicked-in (R. 102, 
647). When Davis retreated into the apartment, the court found 
that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that he was getting 
a weapon or getting the remaining occupants to resist the police 
(R. 105, 647). As such, the court concluded that Davis' 
immediate seizure was "a safety measure for the police" (R. 105). 
The trial court's findings are fully supported by the 
record and, therefore, must be given deference on appeal. Morck, 
821 P.2d at 1192; Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. Additionally, this 
Court may consider any alternative basis to support the court's 
ruling in light of the uncontroverted evidence presented below. 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787-88 n.6 (appellate court may 
find facts to support judgment where there is competent and 
reasonable evidence to do so). The facts to support the trial 
court's finding of exigency are: 
1. The assault investigation was still 
ongoing and the police had not located the 
lawful occupant of the apartment, a white 
male. The police knew that at least 3 males 
were in the apartment, any one of which could 
be the assault victim, a potential hostage, 
or a criminal compatriot. 
2. The crimes being investigated assault, 
burglary of the apartment, and fencing all 
were crimes for which the police could 
reasonably conclude the participants were 
violent. Carter, 707 P.2d at 660 (burglary 
is a crime of violence). This was supported 
by Hunt's report of hearing people struck and 
the officers' observations of the forcibly 
broken front door and the loud continuing 
argument in the apartment. 
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3. The apartment was on the second floor in a 
multiple apartment complex. It was ten 
o'clock in the morning on Veteran's Day when 
it could be assumed that many of the other 
apartments were occupied (R. 1144). If the 
occupants of the apartment decided to 
barricade themselves, the police would not be 
able to isolate the confrontation. 
4. When Davis exited the apartment, he was 
aware of the officers' presence and attempted 
to flee. His action of fleeing alerted the 
other occupants to the police presence. 
5. The basis of any information to support 
criminality was either from Hunt, a private 
citizen, or based on the officers' personal 
observations. 
6. The police had certain information that 
Davis was on the premises because they could 
observe him. 
7. Because it was Veteran's Day, it took over 
4 hours to subsequently secure a search 
warrant. 
8. The entry made was de minimis; the door 
was already open and the officer reached in 
to seize Davis while still standing outside 
the door. 
9. The officers never planned to seize anyone 
when they first responded to the assault 
call. Their investigation escalated while on 
the scene. 
Based on the facts of this case, the officer's warrantless entry 
to seize Davis was justified* 
C. Since the Police Were Lawfully in the 
Apartment, They Had the Right to Conduct a 
Protective Sweep. 
The trial court found that once Davis was seized, the 
police were lawfully in the apartment and had the right to 
conduct a protective sweep for their safety (R. 102-03, 105, 
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552). As the court recognized, a protective sweep must be 
limited to a brief inspection of the premises solely for the 
purpose of securing other persons on the premises. Maryland v. 
Buie, 110 S. Ct. at 1099. It is not a full search and no areas 
which could not secrete a person may be inspected. .Id. Here, 
the court found that the police did not conduct a full search, 
did not open drawers or other impermissible areas, and limited 
their inspection in time and purpose to the detainment of 
persons; for these reasons, the sweep was permissible (R. 103, 
105, 552) (Addenda C & D). 
While Buie was based on a warrant-authorized entry, the 
holding regarding protective sweeps is predicated on the concept 
of any lawful entry. If the police enter lawfully, whether by 
warrant, by consent, or under the exigent circumstances doctrine, 
the determinative factor is their reasonable need to protect 
themselves while making that lawful entry. State v. Kelly, 718 
P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986) (protective sweep permissible where 
police are leaving home following warrantless arrest); Rocha, 600 
P.2d at 546 (protective sweep reasonably following "hot pursuit" 
and seizure of suspect just inside back door). Nor is the 
permissibility of a protective sweep contingent on an entry 
having been made. United States v. Soria, 959 F.2d 855, 857 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 236 (1992) (arrest made 
outside but protective sweep of premises permissible); United 
States v. Hovos, 892 F.2d 1387, 1397 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied. 111 S. Ct. 80 (1990) (protective sweep permissible 
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following warrantless arrest outside premises); United States v. 
Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir. 1977) (if reasonable fear 
of safety, protective sweep allowed regardless of location of 
arrestee); People v. Febus, 566 N.Y.Supp.2d 1000, 1002 (N.Y. App. 
1990), cert, denied, 567 N.Y.Supp.2d 203 (1991) (where seizure 
made just outside partially opened door, fear of safety permitted 
police to fully open door and seize persons in view). But see 
Haves v. State, 797 P.2d 962, 965-68 (Nev. 1990) (in a split 
decision, court adopts Buie as state constitutional standard but 
finds no reasonable suspicion to support protective sweep where 
arrest occurred outside home). Since the permissibility of the 
sweep is driven by the reasonableness of the concern for safety, 
there is no policy reason to permit a protective sweep when the 
entry is made by warrant, but refuse to permit sweeps when the 
entry is lawfully made otherwise. 
Here, the officers were confronted with a dangerous 
situation. This danger escalated when the police attempted to 
seize Davis. The police could see three other occupants in the 
apartment, none of which were the lawful tenant, and all of whom 
were aware of the police presence. Flemmings' action of 
reaching into a pile of clothing and defendant's action of 
running farther into the apartment could reasonably support a 
belief that they were attempting to secure weapons or prepare to 
resist the police presence. Additionally, in light of the 
reported assault and the failure to observe the white male 
occupant, the police could reasonably assume the occupant had 
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been injured but was still on the premises. Based on these 
reasonable concerns for safety, the protective sweep was 
permissible. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THE STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM HE NOW ASSERTS; 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A RATIONALE 
FOR APPLYING A PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD TO A 
PROTECTIVE SWEEP. 
The hearing on defendant and Beavers' motions to 
suppress was held jointly prior to the severance of their trials 
(R. 87, 91, 93a). Both defendants generally asserted that the 
entry into apartment 4B was in violation of the state and federal 
constitutions; Beavers separately asserted that his seizure in 
the Buzzard home was in violation of both constitutions (R. 463-
506). Neither defendant filed a written memorandum in support of 
their state constitutional argument. Instead, defendant supplied 
the court with copies of two law journal articles7 supporting 
separate state constitutional analysis and then argued that 
historically the Utah constitution imposed a "higher" standard 
and "greater protection" than the federal constitution (R. 467). 
The court stated that while it thought a higher state standard 
could be applicable in some contexts, under either the state or 
federal constitution, the issue here was one of fundamental 
reasonableness (R. 468). 
7
 While the record does not specifically identify the 
articles, one apparently was Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search 
and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 14, 17 Utah J. Contemp. L. 267 (1991); the other was only 
identified as from the William and Mary Law Review. 
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Under these circumstances, defendant has failed to 
preserve a state constitutional question. Since 1986, the Utah 
Supreme Court has made clear that appellants who wish to raise 
state constitutional claims must do so with specific analysis. 
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986). This Court has 
been equally clear by refusing to consider state constitutional 
arguments which have not been preserved below nor properly 
analyzed on appeal. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d. 1268, 1272 (Utah 
App. 1990) ("proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and 
probing analysis of state constitutional interpretation is before 
the trial court"). Accord State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 462 n.l 
(Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1993) 
(appellant must offer rationale to diverge from federal 
analysis); State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 552 (Utah 1991) (where 
appellant fails to offer a basis for independent reliance on 
state constitution, appellate court will only consider federal 
analysis). 
Defendant's failure to properly advance and, therefore, 
preserve a separate state constitutional claim can best be seen 
by an analysis of his argument below. As noted, defendant 
asserted on the basis of two articles that Utah was historically 
concerned with illegal searches and seizures because of the 
religious persecution of their church leaders. But as defendant 
admitted, these concerns arose because law enforcement officers 
"would ignore what were at the time traditional Fourth Amendment 
protections" (R. 469) (emphasis added). The fact that federal 
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constitutional protections were not being enforced does not 
provide a historical justification for expansion of state 
constitutional protections. In commenting on the weakness of a 
historical argument to support separate analysis of article I, § 
14 of the Utah Constitution, Professor Paul Cassell states that 
Utah's history establishes that the state constitutional framers' 
fears were not with the scope of the federal amendment governing 
search and seizure but with the harsh federal criminal 
prosecutions which followed. Paul G. Cassell, Taking the Utah 
Constitution Seriously: An Examination of the Mysterious Creation 
of Utah's Exclusionary Rule, 1993 Utah L. Rev. (forthcoming 
August, 1993 ).8 Wanting to prevent the abuses of the polygamy 
prosecutions, the framers invoked more protective language in 
article I, § 4, the freedom of religion provision of the state 
constitution, than found in the federal constitution. This 
concern, however, did not cross-over to article I, § 14, the 
search and seizure provision, which was adopted with the 
identical language of the federal provision. Id. 
Below, defendant's legal arguments advocated no 
different approach than existing fourth amendment law. Defendant 
argued that a warrant is constitutionally required to enter a 
home to make a routine arrest. This is beyond dispute. Payton, 
455 U.S. at 576 100 S. Ct. at 1375; Steaqald, 451 U.S. at 211, 
8
 A complete copy of this article is in the University of Utah 
College of Law library. Addendum F of this brief contains a copy 
of that portion of the article which criticizes Kenneth 
Wallentine's historical approach in the context of article I, § 14 
of the Utah Constitution. 
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101 S. Ct. at 1649; Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255. Defendant asserted that 
pretextual police conduct which induces an exigency must be 
disregarded. Existing fourth amendment law so requires. See 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, S 6.5(b) at 662. Finally, while 
facially asserting that the state constitution provides "greater 
protection,•• defendant advocated adoption of federal exigent 
circumstances case law (R. 482-83). 
Below, defendant argued that the facts did not support 
a protective sweep, arguing that under Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 
there was no basis from which to find that the occupants 
endangered the safety of the officers. On appeal, defendant now 
asserts that the state constitution requires a departure from the 
federal standard governing protective sweeps. For the first 
time, defendant challenges the federal reasonable suspicion 
standard and advocates that protective sweeps be permitted only 
where the officers have probable cause to believe their safety is 
endangered. Because defendant never raised this issue below, he 
has failed to preserve it for purposes of appeal. State v. 
Schnoor, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 24 (Utah App. 1/7/93). 
Even if this Court were to consider the merits of 
defendant's argument, he has failed to establish a need to depart 
from the federal standards governing protective sweeps. See 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1991) (separate state 
constitutional standard necessary where federal standard is 
neither legally nor factually supportable); Larocco, 794 P.2d at 
466 (plurality of supreme court asserting that separate state 
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constitutional standard is appropriate to return to original 
federal standard which had become confused by ensuing federal 
case law); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 149 (Utah App. 1991), 
cert, granted, No. 910218 (Utah 2/5/93) (state constitution 
mandates legislative authorization for suspicionless 
investigatory roadblocks; clarifies federal standard requiring 
"politically accountable" guidelines). Accord State v. Watts, 
750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) (state and federal 
constitutional search and seizure provisions are nearly verbatim 
and should be construed similarly except possibility to protect 
state constitutional law from the "vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given the fourth amendment by federal courts"). 
Here, defendant has not established that federal law governing 
protective sweeps is so inconsistent or confusing so as to 
justify departure from the clear federal standard. 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, Buie/s holding 
neither modified nor diverged from pre-existing federal law. As 
discussed in Point 1(C), to conduct a protective sweep, the 
police must first establish a lawful presence and purpose whether 
by procurement of a warrant or consent or by the existence of 
exigent circumstances. Only then, will a limited protective 
sweep be allowed to protect the officers' safety in conducting 
their lawful business. All Buie did was make clear the standard 
governing the determination of dangerousness. Accord Rocha, 600 
P.2d at 545-46 (approving of pre-Buie protective sweep based on 
reasonable suspicion that additional persons were on premises and 
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armed and that evidence would be destroyed); Kelly, 718 P.2d at 
391 (approving of pre-Buie protective sweep as proper security 
measure). 
Further, if the police needed probable cause to believe 
their safety was in danger before conducting protective measures, 
the safety exception would be nullified. Defendant's position is 
contrary to long-standing judicial recognition of the need for 
officers to take reasonable means to protect themselves while 
conducting lawful searches and seizures. See Point I at 14. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT CANNOT CHALLENGE A DENIAL OF A 
MOTION TO SEVER THROUGH ENTRY OF A 
CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA; EVEN IF THE MERITS 
ARE CONSIDERED, DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED 
THAT THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION. 
Pretrial, defendant moved to sever his trial from that 
of Beavers; the motion was granted (R. 220, 229-33, 235, 430). 
Defendant then moved to sever the Banana Republic burglary and 
theft charges from the Mr. Mac charges, charges joined in a 
single information (R. 8, 23, 24, 432). The State argued that 
the joinder was proper and that judicial economy would not be 
served by severing the counts since the evidence and witnesses 
were essentially the same (R. 442-43). The court balanced these 
factors against defendant's allegation of prejudice, and 
concluded that 
the evidence is so intertwined — the 
closeness in time of the two incidents and 
the fact that all of the evidence for both 
the crimes was found at the same time — the 
evidence being so intertwined and of the same 
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identity as to make it, as a practical 
matter, almost impossible to separate it out 
anyway. I just don't think that this 
particular situation is so prejudicial to the 
defendants that it outweighs the need to get 
the case tried in an efficient manner. 
(R. 453). The motion was denied (R. 236-36A) (Addendum E). 
Subsequently, Beavers was convicted after a jury trial (R. 224-
49, 352-63). Defendant then entered conditional guilty pleas to 
the burglary and theft of property from Banana Republic (Counts I 
and II); under the plea bargain, the Mr. Mac charges were 
dismissed (Counts III and IV) (R. 365, 367-368).9 
A. A Challenge to a Denial of a Motion to 
Sever Cannot Properly Be Preserved Through 
Use of a Conditional Guilty Plea. 
There is no question that defendant intended to enter 
conditional guilty pleas and then appeal the severance denial; 
however, the use of such pleas to raise issues outside the 
context of pretrial motions to suppress evidence is improper.10 
While the Utah Supreme Court has never endorsed the use 
of conditional pleas, this Court recognized their validity in 
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah App. 1988). But Sery 
9
 A defendant must affirmatively establish that the prosecutor 
and court agreed to the entry of a conditional plea. State v. 
Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988). Here, there is no 
transcript of the entry of the pleas and the judgment and 
commitment orders do not indicate that the pleas are conditional 
(R. 396-99). However, an unsigned minute entry indicates that the 
pleas were conditional and defendant's affidavit in support of his 
plea refers to the conditional nature of the pleas (R. 365, 367). 
10
 Much of the present argument is taken from the State briefs 
in State v. Donald H. Keitz, No. 920558-CA, and State v. Eugene 
Montova, No. 920441-CA; these pending cases challenge the use of 
Serv pleas outside the fourth amendment context. 
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only recognized the appropriateness of such pleas to preserve 
challenges to pretrial motions to suppress evidence since the 
only issue was whether the State should be "barred from being 
able to prove its case because of the illegal seizure of 
evidence." Id., at 939. Appellate review of this procedural 
question could legitimately be undertaken without regard to the 
defendant's factual guilt and conserves judicial resources by 
efficiently resolving the issue which would ultimately terminate 
future proceedings. If the trial court's denial of the motion to 
suppress was affirmed on appeal, defendant's otherwise voluntary 
plea would stand. If the ruling on the motion to suppress was 
reversed, the prosecutor was prohibited from proceeding with the 
challenged evidence and further prosecution would be barred. 
Serv not only limited conditional pleas to cases which 
"ultimately hinged" on the admissibility of the challenged 
evidence but relied as authority on cases which expressly limited 
conditional pleas to such circumstances. !£. at 938. 
The problems inherent in expanding the use of 
conditional pleas beyond the fourth amendment context is 
exemplified by this case. Here, the issue is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to 
sever the Mr. Mac and Banana Republic charges.11 Before 
11
 To constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial court's 
determination must be "beyond the limits of reasonability." State 
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). An appellate court 
must "presume that the discretion of the trial court was properly 
exercised unless the record clearly shows the contrary." Goddard 
v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984). Accord State v. 
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1/7/93). 
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reversal would be warranted, defendant must establish not only 
that joinder was improper but that the refusal to sever 
sacrificed his "right to a fundamentally fair trial." State v. 
Lee, 831 P.2d 114, 117 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992) (citing State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah App. 
1990), and State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1350 (Utah 1977), 
cert, denied, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S. Ct. 219 (1978)). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l) (Supp. 1992) permits 
offenses to be joined if they are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are 
otherwise connected together in their 
commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a 
common scheme or plan. 
If the trial court finds that a party is prejudiced by the 
joinder permitted under subsection (1), subsection (4) directs 
that severance be granted. (See Addendum A for text of any rule 
or statute cited). In making this latter determination, a trial 
court may consider whether evidence of both offenses would be 
admissible pursuant to rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, in 
separate trials if no joinder was permitted. Lee, 831 P.2d at 
118-19. In turn, a rule 404(b) determination requires the trial 
court to consider the tendency of the challenged evidence to 
unfairly prejudice a defendant by determining if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Id. 
(citing rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence). The balancing 
requirement is fact-intensive, involving considerations of 
the strength of the evidence as to the 
commission of the other crime, the 
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similarities between the crimes, the interval 
of time that has elapsed between the crimes, 
the interval of time that has elapsed between 
the crimes, the need for the evidence, the 
efficacy of alternative proof and the degree 
to which the evidence probably will rouse the 
jury to overmastering hostility. 
Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 296 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted). 
To obtain a reversal of a conviction arising from a 
trial in which severance was denied, a defendant must establish 
that the failure to sever resulted in a denial of due process, 
that his right to a fair trial was impaired. State v. Velarde, 
734 P.2d 440, 445 (Utah 1986); Lee, 831 P.2d at 117. Thus, even 
where joinder is permissible, denial of a motion may still be 
erroneous if a defendant establishes that but for the admission 
of the other crimes evidence, there is "a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable result." Velarde, 734 P.2d at 445 n.10 (no 
error where evidence of defendant's guilt was substantial). On 
the other hand, where a misjoinder occurs as a matter of law, 
admission of the other crimes evidence will be presumed 
prejudicial and reversal mandated unless the admission of the 
evidence is otherwise permissible. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 
738, 741-42 (Utah 1985) (due process violation found where 
admission of otherwise inadmissible prior crimes evidence 
permitted the jury to infer the defendant's guilt based on his 
criminal history and disposition); State v. Gotfrev, 598 P.2d 
1235, 1238 (Utah 1979) (where appellate court cannot conclude 
that misjoinder did not effect outcome of the trial, reversible 
is appropriate). 
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Appellate review of a denial of a severance motion, 
therefore, involves more than interpretation and application a 
procedural statute, i.e., are the joined offenses part of a 
"common plan or scheme." Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l). It also 
requires review of the trial court's assessment of overall 
prejudice, including the court's balancing of the prejudicial 
impact of the evidence with its probative value. Utah R. Evid. 
403; Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(4). While appellate review of 
these factors is governed by the reasonableness of the lower 
court's exercise of its discretion, it is also governed by the 
impact of the denial of the motion to sever on the ultimate fact-
finder's determination of guilt. The latter function can only be 
undertaken in light of the totality of the evidence presented to 
support the conviction and a consideration of any permissible use 
of the other crimes evidence. 
Proper analysis of a denial of a motion to sever cannot 
be undertaken on the basis of a conditional guilty plea. A 
pretrial record does not provide an adequate evidentiary record 
to judge the impact of the trial court's ruling on defendant's 
right to a fair trial. For even assuming the offenses were 
misjoined, this Court can only speculate as to the impact of that 
error on the outcome of a future trial. In the guilty plea 
context, prejudice cannot be assessed by applying the traditional 
test of whether "but for the substantial error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a different result," for the only result 
supportable by the record is that defendant chose to voluntarily 
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enter a guilty plea. Instead, a modification of the prejudice 
prong is applicable. To establish prejudice in the context of a 
guilty plea, a defendant must establish that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for the substantial error, he 
would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on proceeding 
to trial. C£. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) 
(recognizing this modified test for prejudice in ineffectiveness 
of counsel claims arising in the context of guilty pleas). 
A conditional plea which preserves a severance denial 
amounts to the metaphysical assertion that the defendant is 
guilty but if he had proceeded to trial, he would have 
necessarily been deprived of due process. This is fundamentally 
different from a plea preserving a pretrial suppression issue, 
where the defendant asserts he is guilty but the prosecution is 
barred. Serv, 758 P.2d at 939. For these reasons, this Court 
should prospectively restrict the scope of conditional pleas by 
recognizing their application only to the preservation of 
pretrial motions to suppress evidence. Since defendant entered 
the conditional pleas with the understanding that any pretrial 
issue could be raised on appeal, defendant should be allowed to 
withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to trial. Accord State v. 
Riekkoff, 112 Wis.2d 119, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983) (where prosecutor 
erroneously agreed to entry of a conditional plea, the defendant 
was permitted to withdraw it). Alternatively, defendant may 
dismiss his severance challenge on appeal and proceed solely on 
his evidentiary suppression issues. 
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B. The Trial Court Properly Concluded the 
Banana Republic and Mr. Mac Burglaries Were 
So Factually Intermixed that Their Joinder 
was Permissible and Would Not Result in Undue 
Prejudice to Defendant. 
Even if this Court considers defendant's substantive 
argument, defendant has not established that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying the motion to sever. 
On appeal, defendant attacks the court's ruling on 
three grounds: (1) that State v. Lee, 831 P.2d at 116 was 
incorrect in concluding that rule 9 was repealed by Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-8a-l; (2) that Lee incorrectly defined "common scheme 
or plan"; and (3) that the admission of evidence of both 
burglaries and thefts would have caused a jury to view defendant 
as a "bad person" 
1. Section 77-8a-l Governs Joinder and 
Severance. 
In State v. Lee, this Court considered the identical 
argument defendant now makes concerning section 77-8a-l, that is 
that the legislature did not properly amend or repeal rule 9 in 
passing the statute and therefore, rule 9 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure still controls joinder and severance. (See 
Addendum A for the text of statute and rule.) Defendant has 
advanced no argument or case authority not considered in Lee. 
This Court should summarily reject defendant's argument and re-
affirm that the plain language of the legislative enactment 
expresses the legislature's intent to repeal rule 9. Lee, 831 
P.2d at 116. 
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2. The Definition of "Common Scheme or Plan" 
as Used in Section 77-8a-l Encompasses 
Factually Interrelated Crimes. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, Lee did not provide 
an overly broad definition of "common scheme or plan" as used in 
section 77-8a-l or misapply controlling Utah case law. Just the 
opposite. Lee properly recognized that the legislative enactment 
was a modification of the previous rule. Since the legislature 
was clearly repealing rule 9, the linguistic differences between 
the statute and rule must be presumed intentional. Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n.ll (Utah 1988) (any statutory 
amendment not expressly designated as a clarification must be 
presumed to be change in existing legal rights and liabilities). 
Former rule 9 permitted joinder when the offenses were part of 
the same "criminal episode" as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
401 (1990) (Addendum A). Despite the fact that section 76-1-401 
remains in effect, Section 77-8a-l disregarded the use and 
limitations of "single criminal episode" by utilizing the new 
term "common scheme or plan" without reference to any statutory 
definition. 
Lee defined "common scheme or plan" to include those 
crimes which are so factually interconnected that it is 
reasonable to assume that their commission arose out of a 
calculated plan. 831 P.2d at 117-18. This is consistent with 
the term's usage under the rules of evidence. Rule 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence, permits the admission of other crimes evidence 
when it is probative of a defendant's "motive, opportunity, 
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intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident'1 (emphasis added)* "A common scheme or plan 
is said to exist, for evidentiary purposes, if the proof of one 
crime tends to prove or establish the other." State v. Jones, 
120 Ariz. 556, 587 P.2d 742, 744 (Ariz. 1978) (en banc). Accord 
State v. Galleqos, 781 P.2d 783, 791 (N.M. App. 1989) (citing 1 
C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure; Criminal § 14 3 (2d ed. 
1982)). Under the evidentiary rules, the presumption is that the 
other crimes evidence is relevant and competent if probative of a 
material fact. State v. O'Neil, 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 17 (Utah 
App. 2/12/93). 
Here, the trial court was in a unique position in 
ruling on the motion for severance. It had previously heard 
extensive live testimony regarding the crimes during the 
evidentiary hearing on the motions to suppress. As such, there 
is record support for the trial court's determination that the 
crimes were factually connected. 
As previously discussed (supra at 43), where joinder is 
statutorily permissible, denial of a motion to sever may still be 
erroneous if the defendant establishes that but for the admission 
of the other crimes evidence, there is "a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable result." Velarde, 734 P.2d at 445 n.10. On 
the other hand, where the offenses have been misjoinded as a 
matter of law, admission of the other crimes evidence will be 
presumed prejudicial and reversal mandated unless the admission 
of the evidence is otherwise permissible. Saunders, 699 P.2d at 
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741-42; Gotfrev, 598 P.2d at 1238 (Utah 1979). 
Here, there was no trial since defendant pled guilty. 
Yet, defendant asserts that a jury would have accumulated the 
evidence against him and convicted him simply because he was a 
"bad man," In light of the overwhelming evidence which the State 
had of defendant's guilt, this argument is inapposite. 
Further (supra at 44), the usual test for prejudice, 
i.e., there is a "reasonable likelihood of a different result" if 
separate trials had occurred, is analytically inapplicable to a 
guilty plea. Instead, the proper test is whether but for the 
denial of the severance motion, defendant would not have pled 
guilty and would have proceeded to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. at 59. This is an objective test, made without regard for 
the "idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker." .Id. at 59-
60. Here, defendant pled guilty only after his motion to 
suppress the seized evidence had been denied, Nichols had pled 
guilty and testified against Beavers and Beavers had been 
convicted. Under these circumstances, defendant has not 
established that the denial of his motion to sever affected his 
decision to enter his pleas. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /kf- day of Febiuar.y, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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the foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, attorney for 
appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this _/_ day of March, 1993. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 76-1-401 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 
1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 203. 
Law § 227. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «= 152. 
76-1-305, Lesser included offense for which period of limi-
tations has run. 
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for which the period of 
limitations has not run and the defendant should be found guilty of a lesser 
offense for which the period of limitations has run, the finding of the lesser 
and included offense against which the statute of limitations has run shall not 
be a bar to punishment for the lesser offense. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1*305, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-305. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 198. 
Law § 225. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=> 145V2. 
PART 4 
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder of 
offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single crimi-
nal episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident 
to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of 
Section 77-21-31 in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in crimi-
nal proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-401, enacted by L. cited in this section, was repealed in 1980. For 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-401; 1975, ch. 47, § 1. the present comparable provision, see Rule 9, 
Compiler's Notes. — Section 77-21-31, R. Crim. P. 
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ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE 77-7-15 
chant who initiated a customer's arrest for pur-
pose of effecting a civil remedy to collect money 
owed, even if the money was lawfully owed; 
thus section did not shield auto dealer from 
liability for false imprisonment where cus-
tomer drove away in new truck after leaving 
check for leas than purchase price dealer was 
demanding and dealer called police and asked 
that truck be picked up, saying there had been 
a theft. Greenwell v. Canyon Lincoln Mercury, 
Inc., 575 P.2d 688 (Utah 1978). 
Probable cause. 
—Specific cases. 
There was sufficient evidence upon which to 
base a jury verdict denying damages for false 
arrest, where plaintiff, an eighteen-year-old 
motorcycle rider, had placed a small article of 
merchandise in his helmet, justifying a reason-
able suspicion that he was shoplifting. Fuller 
v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 
(Utah 1975). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Im-
prisonment §§ 44 et seq., 66. 
C.J.S. — 35 CJ.S. False Imprisonment 
§§ 14, 21-25, 40(4)-(7). 
A.L.R. — Defamation: actionability of accu-
sation or imputation of shoplifting, 29 
A.L.R.3d 961. 
Admissibility of defendant's rules or instruc-
tions for dealing with shoplifters in action for 
History: C. 1953, 77-7-15, enacted by L. 
1080, ch. 15, § 2. 
ANALYSIS 
Balancing test. 
Reasonable suspicion test. 
—Out-of-state licenses. 
—Revoked license. 
—Vehicles. 
Unreasonable detention. 
Balancing test 
In traffic violation stops, in balancing the 
—Standard. 
The standard applicable to detentions and 
arrests by merchants is composed of both sub-
jective and objective elements; the merchant 
must allege and prove not only that he be-
lieved in good faith that his conduct was law-
ful, but also that his belief was reasonable; 
even if the crime was not in fact being commit-
ted or attempted, if the merchant in good faith 
believes that such facts are present as to lead 
him to an honest conclusion that a crime is 
being committed by the person to be arrested 
then he may not be held liable for false arrest; 
in determining the reasonableness of the con-
clusion, the test to be applied is one that is 
practical under the circumstances, i.e., 
whether a reasonable and prudent man in his 
position would be justified in believing facts 
which would warrant making the arrest. Terry 
v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979). 
false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, 
31 A.L.R.3d 705. 
Construction and effect in false imprison-
ment action of statute providing for detention 
of suspected shoplifters, 47 A.L.R.3d 998. 
Changing the price tags by patron in self-
service store as criminal offense, 60 A.L.R.3d 
1293. 
Key Numbers. — False Imprisonment •» 2, 
10, 13, 15. 
rights of individuals to be free from arbitrary 
interference by law enforcement officers and 
the government's interest in crime prevention 
and public protection, if a hypothetical reason-
able police officer would not have stopped the 
driver for the cited traffic offense, and the sur-
rounding circumstances indicate the stop is a 
pretext, the stop is unconstitutional. State v. 
Sierra, 754 T2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reason-
able suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and 
an explanation of his actions. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
461 
CRIMINAL OFFENSE CHARGES 77-8a- l 
77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defendants. 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if each ofifense is a separate count and if the 
offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in 
their commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
(2) (a) When a felony and misdemeanor are charged together the defendant 
is afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to both the misdemeanor 
and felony offenses. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or 
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or 
conduct or in the same criminal episode. 
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or 
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count. 
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, 
they shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion on motion or 
otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or 
both to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is 
more than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or informa-
tion. 
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a 
single indictment or information. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a 
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a 
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate 
trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other 
relief as justice requires. 
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived 
if the motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a 
motion by defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to 
disclose any statements made by the defendants which he intends to 
introduce in evidence at the trial. 
History: C. 1953, 77-8a-l, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 201, 5 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — This section is a re-
codification of former § 77-35-9, which is Rule 
9 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. For 
notes to cases construing that rule, see the 
Court Rules volume. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 201 be-
came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26. 
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 9 
What constitutes assertion of right to coun-
sel following Miranda warnings — federal 
cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 622. 
Rule 9. Joinder of offenses and of defendants. 
(a) Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or infor-
mation in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged arise out of 
a criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401, U.C.A. 1953. A felony of-
fense and a misdemeanor offense may be charged in the same indictment or 
information if: 
(1) they arise out of a criminal episode; and 
(2) the defendant is afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to the 
misdemeanor along with the felony offense. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or 
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or conduct 
or in the same criminal episode. 
Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or sepa-
rately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count. 
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they 
shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion, on motion or otherwise, 
orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
(c) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to 
be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more than one, 
could have been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure 
shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or 
information. 
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a 
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information, or by a 
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of 
separate counts, or grant a severance of defendants, or provide such other 
relief as justice requires. 
A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived if the 
motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a motion by 
defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to disclose any 
statements made by the defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence 
at the trial. 
Cross-References. — Limited admissibility Right not to be twice put in jeopardy for 
of evidence, Rule 105, U.R.E. same offense, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12; 
Multiple prosecutions and double jeopardy, f 77-1-6. 
§§ 76-1-401 to 76-1-405. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Denial of severance. 
—Standard of review. 
Discretion of trial court 
Failure to request severance. 
Joinder or severance of defendants. 
—Antagonistic defenses. 
—Cautionary instructions. 
—Specific cases. 
—Waiver of objections. 
Joinder or severance of offenses. 
—In general. 
—Specific cases. 
—Waiver of objections. 
Motions to sever. 
—Timeliness. 
Cited. 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 403 
overruled on other grounds, McFarland v. 
Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — United States v. 
Downing'. Novel Scientific Evidence and the 
Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839. 
Note, Establishing Paternity Through HLA 
Testing: Utah Standards for Admissibility, 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 717. 
AX.R. — Admissibility of voice stress evalu-
ation test results or of statements made during 
test. 47 A.L.R.4th 1202. 
Admissibility and weight of evidence of prior 
misidentification of accused in connection with 
commission of crime similar to that presently 
charged, 50 A.LJUth 1049. 
Products liability: admissibility of evidence 
of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th 
1186. 
Thermographic tests: admissibility of test re-
sults in personal injury suits, 56 A.L.R.4th 
1105. 
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination 
lineups, 63 A.L.R.4th 143. 
Products liability: admissibility of experi-
mental or test evidence to disprove defect in 
motor vehicle, 64 A.L.R.4th 125. 
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence 
of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary blood-
stains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588. 
Admissibility, in prosecution for sex-related 
offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal 
fluids, 75 A.L.R.4th 897. 
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or 
enhanced testimony, 77 A.L.R.4th 927. 
Admissibility of DNA identification evi-
dence, 84 A.L.R.4th 313. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively 
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as 
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The 
change in language is not one of substance, 
since "surprise" would be within the concept of 
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402 
[Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee Note 
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a contin-
uance in most instances would be a more ap-
propriate method of dealing with "surprise." 
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 
(ND. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric 
testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and 
violation of due process). See the following 
Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions 
Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 
1982). 
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed refer-
ence to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule 
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and 
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference. 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Balancing test. 
Bias. 
Circumstantial evidence. 
Credibility of witness. 
Cumulative evidence. 
Determination of admissibility. 
Expert testimony. 
Film of murder scene. 
Guilty plea. 
Impeachment of witness. 
Inflammatory evidence. 
Offensive remark. 
Other offenses. 
Photographic evidence. 
Prior convictions. 
—Impeachment. 
Scientific evidence. 
Standard of review. 
Tape recordings. 
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Rule 404 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
errung exclusion of relevant evidence, did not 
depnve defendant of his due process right to a 
firor trial State v Fulton, 742 P 2d 1208 (Utah 
1987), cert denied, 484 U S 1044, 108 S Ct 
777, 98 L Ed 2d 864 (1988) 
Cited in State v. Bell 770 PM 100 (Utah 
1988), State v McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 (Utah 
1988), Belden v Dalbo, Inc, 752 P 2d 1317 
(Utah Ct App 1988), State v Jamison, 767 
P.2d 134 (Utah Ct App 1989), State v 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), State v 
Featherson, 781 P 2d 424 (Utah 1989), Ostler 
v Albina Transf Co , 781 P.2d 446 (Utah Ct 
App 1989), State v Johnson, 784 PJ2d 1135 
(Utah 1989), State v Gotschall, 782 P 2d 459 
(Utah 1989), State v Cox, 787 P 2d 4 (Utah Ct 
App 1990), State v Lopez, 789 P 2d 39 (Utah 
Ct App 1990), State v Rocco, 795 P 2d 1116 
(Utah 1990), Whitehead v American Motors 
Sales Corp , 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990), State v 
Harrison, 152 Utah Adv Rep 19 (Ct App 
1991), State v Pascual, 804 P 2d 553 (Utah Ct 
App 1991), State v Taylor, 169 Utah Adv 
Rep 62 (Ct App 1991), State v Reed, 172 
Utah Adv Rep 31 (Ct App 1991), State v 
Hamilton, 174 Utah Adv Rep 7 (1991), 
Knight v Ebert, 175 Utah Adv Rep 38 (Ct 
App 1991) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Chapman v State 
Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony — An Issue 
of Admissibility or Credibility, 1983 Utah L 
Rev 381 
United States v Downing- Novel Scientific 
Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah 
L Rev 839 
Recent Developments m Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1987 Utah L 
Rev 137 
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child 
Abuse Litigation, 1988 Utah L Rev 479 
Note, Enhancing Penalties by Admitting 
*Bad Character" Evidence During the Guilt 
Phase of Criminal Trials — State v Bishop, 
1989 Utah L Rev 1013 
State v Rimmasch Utah's Threshold Admis-
sibility Standard for Child Sexual Abuse Pro-
file Evidence, 1990 Utah L Rev 641 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Com-
ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the 
Courtroom New Utah Rules and Their Consti-
tutional Implications, 15 J Contemp L 81 
(1989) 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence 
§ 253 et seq 
C.J.S — 31A C J S Evidence § 166 
AJLR. — Noncharacter witnesses in civil 
case, limiting number of, 5 A L R 3d 169 
Noncharacter witnesses in criminal case, 
limiting number of, 5 A L R 3d 238 
Character or reputation witnesses, propriety 
and prejudicial effect of trial court's limiting 
number of, 17 A L R 3d 327 
Evidence offered by defendant at federal 
criminal trial as inadmissible, under Rule 403 
of Federal Rules of Evidence, on ground that 
probative value is substantially outweighed by 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, 
or misleading the jury, 76 A L R Fed 700 
Key Numbers. — Evidence «» 143 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove con-
duct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted 
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except* 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his charac-
ter offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that 
the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that 
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
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purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule i6 
the federal rule, verbatim. Provisions of this 
rule apply to character evidence to prove con-
duct, as distinguished from proof of character 
where character i6 an essential element of a 
charge, claim or defense. As to the latter, see 
Rule 405(b). See also Advisory Committee 
Note to Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was 
comparable. See also State v. Day, 572 P.2d 
703 (Utah 1977) (character evidence as to the 
character of the victim of a homicide was ad-
missible to rebut the defendant's contention 
that the deceased was the aggressor). One sig-
nificant difference between this rule and Rule 
47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) is that there 
is no provision for the use of character evidence 
in civil cases, except where character is the 
ultimate issue in question, whereas Rule 47 
authorized the use of character evidence in 
civil cases not only on the ultimate issue but 
where otherwise substantively relevant. See 
Boyce, Character Evidence: The Substantive 
Use, 4 Utah Bar J. 13, 18-19 (1976). However, 
Rule 48, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) ex-
pressly excluded character evidence with re-
spect to a trait as to care or skill. The Advisory 
Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence 
concluded that the remaining justification for 
the admission of character evidence was so in-
significant that character evidence in civil 
cases should not be admitted unless it was in 
issue. 
Subdivision (b) is comparable to Rule 55, 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). State v. For-
syth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982). See Boyce, 
Evidence of Other Crimes or Wrongdoing, 5 
Utah Bar J. 31 (1977). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Application of rule. 
Character of accused. 
Character of codefendant. 
Common plan or scheme. 
Harmless error. 
Identity. 
Knowledge and intent. 
Limiting instruction. 
Other crimes. 
—Defense. 
Proof of motive. 
Severance. 
Specific instances of conduct. 
Victim's character. 
Cited. 
Application of rule. 
Admissibility of evidence of an act that con-
stitutes an early step in the effectuation of the 
crime for which defendant is presently charged 
and tried is not governed by this rule. State v. 
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980). 
Character of accused. 
When it becomes apparent from the evidence 
that the defendant is relying upon the defense 
of entrapment, the State must be allowed to 
present any evidence in impeachment or rebut-
tal that would show the defendant's disposition 
to commit the crime charged, including prior 
acts of crime or misconduct. State v. Hansen, 
588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978). 
By offering witnesses as to his reputation as 
a truthful person, defendant opens the door for 
the prosecution to impeach his character wit-
nesses; prosecution may attempt to discredit 
the testimony of such witnesses by showing 
that they have not heard specific reports that 
are relevant to defendant's reputation, but it 
cannot present evidence of the truth or falsity 
of specific beliefs or reports pertaining to that 
reputation. State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158 (Utah 
1981). 
While evidence of defendant's criminal char-
acter may be, and generally is, excluded under 
Subdivision (b) of this rule when such evidence 
is elicited or offered by the prosecution to prove 
its case-in-chief, the same evidence may be ad-
missible when the responsibility for its intro-
duction may be traced to the defendant. State 
v. Barney, 681 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1984). 
Since a defendant's character is not an ele-
ment of the crime of sexual abuse of a child, 
the court does not err in denying the request of 
a defendant charged with such crime for ad-
mission of past instances of conduct relating to 
his deputation for sexual morality." State v. 
Mixler, 709 P.2d 350 (Utah 1985). 
Character of codefendant 
Proffered testimony as to (^defendant's im-
pulsiveness had no bearing on defendant's 
guilt or innocence and was not admissible. 
State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586 (Utah 1983). 
Common plan or scheme. 
In prosecution for violation of § 76-6-404, 
where it was alleged that defendant had, with-
out authorization, taken a check payable to his 
employer which came into his possession in the 
course of his employment, endorsed it in the 
employer's name, and deposited it to an ac-
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
County Attorney 
RUTH J. McCLOSKEY, Bar No. 2153 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
A) MICHAEL DEAN BEAVERS 1/6/66, 
B) ANTHONY HARRIS 12/6/71, 
C) -MICHAEL SEAN NICHOLS 3/26/70, 
D) TERRENCE B. FbEMMfNGS' 6/25/67, 
Defendant(s). 
Screened by: 
Assigned to: 
R. McCloskey 
R. McCloskey 
BAIL $10,000.00 
(Each Defendant) 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 
?6fr/30/3 ?* 
The undersigned S. Cheever - SLCPD under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
BURGLARY, a Third Degree Felohy, at 648 East 500 South, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about November 12, 1990, 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants, 
MICHAEL DEAN BEAVERS, ANTHONY IIARRI3, MICHAEL SEAM" NICHOLS 
«emd TERRENCE--*-*—FfcEMMIUGS-, asf party** to the offense, 
entered or remained unlawfully in the building of Banana 
Republic with the intent to commit a theft; 
(Continued on page 2) 
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STATE V. 
A) MICHAEL DEAN BEAVERS, #90 1 81906 
B) ANTHONY HARRIS, 90 1 81906 
C) MICHAEL SEAN NICHOLS, 90 1 81906 
D) TERRENCE B. FLEMMINGS, 90 1 81906 
Page 2 
COUNT II 
THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 648 East 500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about November 12, 1990, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants, MICHAEL 
DEAN BEAVERS, JbHWiONY^HARRIS,— MICHAEL—C£AN~~tJICHOLS and -
TSnrtENOE P. FLBMHIMCfi, asApartiWs to the offense, obtained 
or exercised unauthorized control over the property of 
Banana Republic with the purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof, and that the value of said property exceeded 
$1,000.00; 
COUNT III 
BURGLARY, a Third Degree Felony, at 1090 East 7200 South, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about November 12, 199 0, 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants, 
MICHAEL DEAN BEAVERS, ANTHONY HftFPT,?, -Ml^PrFJi-IWiftf-WT^ttnTF* 
arrd—TERRENCE—B* •^FiiEMMINgQ", as A parties to the offense, 
entered or remained unlawfully in the building of Mr. Mac 
with the intent to commit a theft; 
COUNT IV 
THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 1090 East 7200 South, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about November 12, 1990, 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants, 
MICHAEL DEAN BEAVERS, ANTHONY IIARRI0, MICIIASL SEAN NICHOLS 
and TFRRFNCF P FLFMNIF^F-, as ^ parti*? to the offense, 
obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the 
property of Mr. Mac with the purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof, and that the value of said property exceeded 
$1,000.00; 
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT: further, that the offenses were committed 
in concert with two or more persons in the commission or 
furtherance of the offenses, giving rise to enhanced 
penalties as provided by Section 76-3-203.1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended; 
(Continued on page 3) 
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Officers: M. Humphries, T. Berger, S. Cheever, Atkinson, G. 
Yoshikawa, Slagowski, L. Kilpack and D. Knudsen. 
Others: Lori Billings, David Hunt, Wayne L. Ware and Stan 
Christensen. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Affiant, a Detective with Salt Lake City Police Department 
bases his information on report, Case No. 90-18176 prepared by Salt 
Lake City P.D. Officer Humphries and report, Case No. 123183 prepared 
by Salt Lake County Sheriff's Deputy Slagowski which indicates that 
at above time and place; 
1. Defendants all participated in a break in of a business 
called Banana Republic by throwing a shopping cart threw a window. 
2. Defendants removed 52 canvas coats with a total retail 
value of $3,140.00. 
3. Defendants later drove to Mr. Mac's, a retail clothing 
store and broke in to the business by driving their vehicle into the 
front of the store. 
4. Defendants removed over 20 leather jackets retail value 
of more than $200.00 a piece. 
5. Defendants did not have permission to enter the 
business nor to remove the clothing. 
6. Defendants Beavers, Harris, and Nichols all admitted to 
affiant as to their involvement with both burglaries. 
(Continued on page 4) 
ADDENDUM C 
1 tighter look under the Utah Constitution than it does the 
2 federal constitution. Still, the same issue was reasonable 
3 in this particular instance. And even with that higher 
4 standard, I am inclined to believe the initial entry into 
5 the apartment was reasonable. 
6 Seems to me they gave the officer very certain 
7 information. They have a report of an assault. Language 
8 like, "Don't kill me." They had a report there had been 
9 some sort of commotion or problem the night before. They 
10 see the door and it's broken, happened the night before, 
11 happened a few minutes sooner, who knows, but it happened. 
12 They hear the voices, sort of an argument going on, and 
13 then as the man comes out, he backs up and tries to go back 
14 in. To me that is a very dangerous scenario for police 
15 officers. Seems to me just reasonable to see when a man is 
16 going back into the apartment, who knows what he is going 
17 to do? Is he going to get a weapon? Is he going to get 
18 some friends, tell the others so they can hole up? They 
19 don't know if there are weapons involved. 
20 It seems to me that's just a very dangerous 
21 situation for officers. It's reasonable at that point to 
22 stop them, even if they have to go in a couple of feet, get 
23 them on the floor, subdue them. I think they had the right 
24 to do that. 
25 And what comes next? Was it reasonable to go in 
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1 further again? I have to conclude that it was. They see 
2 another man going into the kitchen. Again, exactly the 
3 same very dangerous situation for police officers. Is he 
4 going in there to get another weapon? There are other 
5 people in there. 
6 Now, they are even in a more dangerous situation 
7 because they are in an apartment they don't know about. 
8 They don't know where the rooms are. Who's there? I think 
9 they have a right go through the apartment at that point 
10 and see if all the people aren't accounted for. 
11 Now, if they looked in some drawer or some purses 
12 or something small where a person couldn't be hiding, I 
13 think that would be unreasonable. But to look in every 
14 room, in closets, under the beds, places where people could 
15 hide, I don't think is unreasonable at all. 
16 At that point, then, they see the coats in plain 
17 view. They know there's been a burglary in the Banana 
18 Republic. Nobody has a whole bunch of brand new coats on a 
19 hanger. The Banana Republic labels, that is a very 
20 suspicious thing, and it seems to me that gave rise to the 
21 search warrant. I don't think there was a question of 
22 destroying evidence, or anything to do with evidence, or 
23 anything to do with a burglary, or information about a 
24 burglary, or whether the coats were leather or cloth, or 
25 anything like that until that point. I don't think the 
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1 officers were trying to solve a burglary; they were trying 
2 to investigate an assault and they were trying to protect 
3 themselves, and I think they did so reasonably. 
4 Then they saw that they had probable cause to 
5 secure the area, to question the witnesses and get a 
6 warrant, and that's what they did, so I don't think 
7 anything they seized there needs to be suppressed. I don't 
8 think they violated any Fourth Amendment rights at the 
9 apartment• 
10 Then the question seems to focus on the house. 
11 At the house they see Beavers through the window. Seems to 
12 me they could have just watched all the doors and not let 
13 him out and got a warrant. And I think it was an improper 
14 thing to do. They are within the house. Then what flows 
15 from that? So far as I can see, nothing. Because they 
16 arrest him, they take him out, they shouldn't have done 
17 that. Okay. 
18 But then they ask the owner of the place, the 
19 renter, the primary occupant, "Can we look in his room?" 
20 Now, he only lived there for five days. It's really her 
21 house. Apparently, he has standing. I have no question 
22 about that. He has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
23 the place, but it's her place as well, it's not like he 
24 rented it from her, had the right to exclude her from it. 
25 I don't think there is any evidence he had the right to 
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1 exclude her from it. 
2 There were only some other clothes in there, 
3 children's clothes, things that weren't his, all kinds of 
4 clothes, as I recall the testimony. I think the evidence 
5 is that he did have a right of privacy in there. He had no 
6 right to exclude her, and she had the right to make a 
7 consent, and she consented. I think the evidence is clear 
8 I don't find her consent statement to be hearsay. I think 
9 that it was not hearsay. She said she consents. 
10 They searched that apartment, that room, with her 
11 consent and, therefore, there is nothing to suppress there. 
12 I think that supersedes the problem with the warrantless 
13 arrest. They would have searched that room anyway, even if 
14 they had got a warrant and I think the consent does away 
15 with any problem in searching that room. 
16 They take him into the car and they ask him about 
17 the coats. He said they were in the car, no Miranda 
18 warning. That's a violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
19 That's a violation of Miranda, I have no doubt of that. 
20 And his statement will be excluded under Miranda. But I 
21 don't think that makes the search of the automobile 
22 unlawful, because the evidence is that they were wondering 
23 whether the coats were in the automobile anyway. They had 
24 been told they were in the automobile and they asked the 
25 owner of the automobile if they could search her car, and 
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1 she said yes, and she gave her consent. So I don't see any 
2 reason why that should be suppressed. 
3 So what it boils down to, it seems to me, in the 
4 end, the only single thing in this whole hearing that 
5 really needs to be suppressed is that one single statement 
6 he made in the car without being given Miranda warnings, 
7 and the rest is all reasonable under both the Fourth 
8 Amendment and the state constitution, for the most part. 
9 Nith that small exception, the motion to suppress is 
10 denied. I will ask Ms. McCloskey to prepare Findings of 
11 Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with the statement I 
12 just made. 
13 MS. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
14 MR. MOFFAT: Thank you, your Honor. 
15 MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you. 
16 THE COURT: Court will be in recess. 
17 (Hearing coneluded.) 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 
3 
4 STATE OF UTAH ) 
t SB. 
5 SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
6 
7 
8 I, NORA S. WORTHEN, an official court reporter 
9 for the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
10 County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that I reported 
11 stenographically the proceedings in the matter of State of 
12 Utah versus Michael Dean Beavers, and Anthony Harris, 
13 Case No. 901901946, 901901947, respectively, and that the 
14 above and foregoing is a true and correct transcript of 
15 said proceedings. 
16 
17 Dated this 23rd day of March 1992. 
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ADDENDUM D 
Ti'tifc! JLa*CiE» District 
MAY 1 4 1991 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT1" 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
CASE NO. 901901946 FS 
vs. : 901901947 
MICHEAL DEAN BEAVERS, : 
ANTHONY HARRIS, 
Defendants. 
On April 1, 1991, the Court heard evidence pursuant to 
defendants' Motion to Suppress. Defendants allege that the 
warrantless entry into Apartment 4B at 837 East 700 South, and 
a residence located at 1334 South 1000 East were improper and 
unreasonable under both the Federal and State Constitutions. 
On April 16, 1991, the Court heard arguments from counsel and, 
based on the evidence in said arguments, made the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 12, 1990, at approximately 9:51 a.m., 
police officers arrived at the address of 837 East 700 South, 
STATE V. BEAVERS PAGE TWO FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
Apartment 4B, on an assault call. Radio dispatches included 
information to the effect that someone said "don't kill me.11 
2. Upon arrival at the apartment building, officers met 
with Mr. Hunt, the apartment manager, who directed the officers 
to apartment 4B. 
3. Upon arrival at apartment 4B, officers found a 
recently damaged door, and heard an argument coming from inside 
the apartment. The officers listened at the door briefly, and 
could hear an argument inside the apartment about a coat. The 
officers did not knock on the door, or notify the occupants of 
their presence at the door. 
4. A person who came out of the apartment carrying a 
coat, was later identified as Dexter Davis. As soon as he 
detected the officers' presence, he tried to retreat into the 
apartment. Officer Humphries reached into the apartment, 
grabbed Dexter Davis, and pulled him to the ground. 
5. At the same instant that Dexter Davis was taken to the 
ground, Officer Humphries could see into the apartment, and 
observed an individual quickly move into the kitchen out of the 
line of sight. 
6. The police then went into the apartment and detained 
the individuals who were present. 
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7. Officer Humphries then walked through the apartment 
searching for other individuals. He searched under the bed, 
and in closets, and other places where persons could be hiding, 
but did not search in smaller areas. 
8. While looking through the apartment for individuals, 
Officer Humphries observed a large number of new coats hanging 
in closets. These were in plain sight and could be seen 
without opening doors or moving contents. 
9. Prior to the time that the officers had arrived at the 
scene, they were aware of a burglary of coats at Banana 
Republic. 
10. Following the observation of the coats, Officers 
Humphries, Foster and Beger secured apartment 4B and its 
contents, and summoned Detectives Cheever and Yoshikawa to the 
scene. 
11. Officer Yoshikawa then left the scene to obtain a 
search warrant. 
12. Detective Cheever was told by people at the scene that 
defendant Beavers had gone to a house on 10th East. 
13. Sergeant Brown then went to the house on 10th East. 
Upon arriving, he could see defendant Beavers through the 
window and could have waited for an arrest warrant. Instead, 
he went into the home to arrest defendant Beavers. 
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14. In the meantime, Detective Yoshikawa obtained a search 
warrant and searched apartment 4B. 
15. After Beavers was arrested, Karren Buzzard, the owner 
of the home, consented to allow Sergeant Atkinson to search the 
room where Mr. Beavers was staying. Beavers had been staying 
there a day or two, and in addition to items belonging to Ms. 
Buzzard, the room contained many other items, including 
children's stuffed animals. 
16. Sergeant Atkinson seized several coats from the room 
where Beavers was staying. 
17. Mr. Beavers did not have the right to exclude the 
homeowner from the room, in that he was not a paying tenant and 
items belonging to the homeowner were within the room. 
18. While Mr. Beavers was in custody, and without advising 
him of his rights, Sergeant Atkinson asked him if the coats 
were still in the car, to which Beavers responded in the 
affirmative. 
19. Sergeant Atkinson previously had information that 
stolen coats were in the car. This information was obtained 
from the persons at apartment 4B. 
20. The owner of the car gave her consent to Sergeant 
Atkinson to search the car. 
21. Several coats were found in the car. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The initial entry in apartment 4B at 837 East 700 
South was a reasonable search and seizure under both the 14th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, and no evidence is to be 
excluded as a result of said entry. The initial detention of 
Dexter Davis was reasonable in light of the fact that Davis may 
have had a weapon, may have been retreating into the apartment 
to secure a weapon, or the like. His detention was necessary 
as a safety measure for the police officers. 
2. The further intrusion into the apartment was also 
reasonable and not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, nor Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution, in that this was also required by the 
officer's safety. The person retreating into the kitchen and 
out of the line of sight could have been trying to get a weapon 
or take an offensive position. It was reasonable for the 
officers' safety at this time that they apprehend the person 
who went into the kitchen and look through the apartment for 
other individuals who may have weapons. 
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3. Because the officers had a right to be in the 
apartment to look for other individuals, the coats, seen in 
plain sight, were not found as a result of an unreasonable 
search. 
4. The coats, with new labels, in light of the officers' 
knowledge of a burglary at Banana Republic, provided sufficient 
information to form probable cause, secure the apartment, and 
seek a search warrant. Therefore, the coats and other evidence 
taken at the scene pursuant to the search warrant will not be 
suppressed. 
5. Although the entry to effect the arrest of Michael 
Beavers into the home at 1334 South 1000 East was not 
reasonable under either the 14th Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, nor the Utah Constitution, no evidence directly 
flowed from said entry and subsequent arrest, so none is 
suppressed. 
6. The coats found in the room at the home on 1334 South 
1000 East were found as a result of a consensual search. The 
consent was given by a person having a right to entry to the 
room, and will not be suppressed. 
7. The statement made by Mr. Beavers regarding the coats 
in the car will be suppressed as a violation of his rights 
under the Miranda decision. 
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8. The coats found in the trunk of the car will not be 
suppressed as evidence due to the fact that police had 
information from other sources that the coats were in the car, 
and the owner of the car gave her consent to the search. 
Dated this I H day of May, 1991. 
SCOTTMNIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
to the following, this (A, dav of May, 1991: 
Ruth J. McCloskey 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger K. Skowcroft 
Mark A. Moffat 
Attorneys for Defendants 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
*4l/^s 
By. 
Third JuG;o?ai District 
JUN 6 1991 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT" 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHEAL DEAN BEAVERS, 
ANTHONY HARRIS, 
Defendants. 
AMENDMENT TO FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 901901946 FS 
901901947 FS 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the 
Court on May 14, 1991 are amended as follows: 
1. Paragraph 13 is amended to read as follows: Sergeant 
Atkinson then went to the house on 10th East. Upon arriving, 
he could see defendant Beavers through the window, and could 
have awaited for an arrest warrant. Instead he went into the 
home to arrest defendant Beavers. 
Dated this _day of June, 1991. 
. \ ( dp^Oi , >(2i 
SCOTT DANIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ADDENDUM E 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RUTH J. MCCLOSKEY, Bar No. 2153 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
O R D E R 
P l a i n t i f f , ) 
v. ) Case No. 901901946FS 
& 901901947FS 
MICHAEL D. BEAVERS & ) 
ANTHONY HARRIS Honorable Scott Daniels 
Defendants. ) 
On August 30, 1991, the Court heard arguments from counsel 
regarding the severance of the defendants from one another, the 
severance of Counts I and II from Counts III and IV for each 
defendant, and Count V from the other counts for defendant Beavers. 
Due to the substantial intertwining of the evidence in 
this case, it was determined by the Court that the defendants would 
not be unduly prejudiced by having a single trial on Counts I, II, 
III, IV, for each defendant. Count V, however, should be severed 
and remanded to the Circuit Court for trial. 
Based upon agreement by the State, defendant Beavers and 
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ORDER 
Case No's 901901946FS 
& 901901947FS 
Page two 
defendant Harris will be tried separately. 
DATED this 3 day of September, 1991 
BY THE COURT: 
UJ&h 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
Third District Court Judge 
RMc/sc/0431 
1 the state of mind of the officers. 
2 THE COURT: Well, I think I understand your 
3 position. I appreciate it. They are necessary with what 
4 you have briefed—not briefed, exactly—provided me with 
5 the opinions and the law and laid it out very well. And I 
6 do agree with you, Ms. McCloskey, the facts are pretty well 
7 on the table. I think that it's all there and I think that 
8 I can rule as a result. 
9 Okay. The first issue is, was the initial 
10 intrusion into the apartment reasonable within the meaning 
11 of the Utah State Constitution and the federal 
12 constitution. I might just say, for the record, that 1 
13 agree with Mr. Moffat's argument that the Utah State 
14 Constitution is, in many instances, broader than the 
15 protection of the federal constitution. The history of our 
16 constitution, both in the early history of the people who 
17 came before they got here and also the prosecutions that 
18 were conducted in the early part of our history, would 
19 indicate to me that they were more concerned about 
20 protecting individual rights than others may have been. 
21 And our founding fathers indicated that we should have 
22 broader protections. 
23 Nevertheless, in questions of search and seizure, 
24 the question still comes down to reasonableness. Maybe, as 
25 Mr. Moffat said, what's reasonable may take a little 
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1 tighter look under the Utah Constitution than it does the 
2 federal constitution. Still, the same issue was reasonable 
3 in this particular instance. And even with that higher 
4 standard, I am inclined to believe the initial entry into 
5 the apartment was reasonable. 
6 Seexas to me they gave the officer very certain 
7 information. They have a report of an assault. Language 
8 like, "Don't kill me." They had a report there had been 
9 some sort of commotion or problem the night before. They 
10 see the door and it's broken, happened the night before, 
11 happened a few minutes sooner, who knows, but it happened. 
12 They hear the voices, sort of an argument going on, and 
13 then as the man comes out, he backs up and tries to go back 
14 in. To me that is a very dangerous scenario for police 
15 officers. Seems to me just reasonable to see when a man is 
16 going back into the apartment, who knows what he is going 
17 to do? Is he going to get a weapon? Is he going to get 
18 some friends, tell the others so they can hole up? They 
19 don't know if there are weapons involved. 
20 It seems to me that's just a very dangerous 
21 situation for officers. It's reasonable at that point to 
22 stop them, even if they have to go in a couple of feet, get 
23 them on the floor, subdue them. I think they had the right 
24 to do that. 
25 And what comes next? Was it reasonable to go in 
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1 exclude her from it. 
2 There were only some other clothes in there, 
3 children's clothes, things that weren't his, all kinds of 
4 clothes, as I recall the testimony. I think the evidence 
5 is that he did have a right of privacy in there. He had no 
6 right to exclude her, And she had the right to make a 
7 consent, and she consented. I think the evidence is clear 
8 I don't find her consent statement to be hearsay. I think 
9 that it was not hearsay. She said she consents. 
10 They searched that apartment, that room, with her 
11 consent and, therefore, there is nothing to suppress there. 
12 I think that supersedes the problem with the warrantless 
13 arrest. They would have searched that room anyway, even if 
14 they had got a warrant and I think the consent does away 
15 with any problem in searching that room. 
16 They take him into the car and they ask him about 
17 the coats. He said they were in the car, no Miranda 
18 warning. That's a violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
19 That's a violation of Miranda, I have no doubt of that. 
20 And his statement will be excluded under Miranda. But I 
21 don't think that makes the search of the automobile 
22 unlawful, because the evidence is that they were wondering 
23 whether the coats were in the automobile anyway. They had 
24 been told they were in the automobile and they asked the 
25 owner of the automobile if they could search her car, and 
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ADDENDUM F 
UTAH EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
e. The history of Mormon polygamy prosecutions does not provide a basis for 
interpreting article I, section 14 
Sometimes it is argued that the history of polygamy prosecutions of some 
Mormons means that the framers of the Utah Constitution intended to adopt 
stronger protections against abusive police practices than other states, protections 
that are embodied in article I, section 14.327 To date Kenneth Wallentine has 
provided the most detailed exposition of this argument for an expansive 
interpretation of article I, section 14. One can gain the flavor of his thesis in the 
following excerpt: 
As part of the anti-polygamy enforcement, the fourth amendment was 
often discarded and ignored by U.S. marshals, other law enforcement officers 
and courts. Early accounts tell of federal marshals who saw little need for the 
aid of search warrants.... 
Against this history of unprecedented federal, judicial abuse, arises a 
theory that the search and seizure provision in the Utah Constitution was 
included as a deliberate, considered act, rather than part of a wholesale 
importation of constitutional language.. . . 
Drafters of Utah's early constitutions were intimately familiar with 
egregious searches of the sort unknown since the days of King George. Reason 
dictates that the drafters were acutely concerned with providing protection and 
remedies against unlawful searches and seizures.828 
The difficulties with this argument are numerous: First, the argument 
places too much weight on an unexpressed, subjective intention of the framers of 
the Utah Constitution. Second, the framers of the constitution adopted specific 
rights responsive to the freedom of religion concerns raised by the polygamy 
prosecutions. It is these provisions - not article I, section 14 - that were 
designed to deal with abusive practices. Third, a careful reading of the historical 
from recalling historical tragedies only by pleading that they shall not happen again"). I am suggesting only 
that Justice for criminal wrongdoers is a strong tradition in the state. Indeed, as I have suggested elsewhere, 
the best way to avoid "self-help" measures may be to insure that a state's criminal law actually imposes just 
punishment on convicted criminals. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: 
A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121,157 (1988). 
327.. Set, *£., Brief for Appellant Greg Hewitt at 22, State v. Hewitt, No. 910335-CA (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
328. Wallentine, supra note 226, at 276-79 (citations omitted). For an excellent description of the polyg-
amy prosecutions, see EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLUN MANGRUM, ZlON IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL 
HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830-1900 125-260 (1988). 
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documents suggests that the framers' primary experience was with harsh federal 
prosecutions rather than abuse at the hands of their own, locally-controlled police 
forces. Finally, there are competing traditions among the Mormon settlers 
bearing more directly on the exclusionary rule issue that squarely cut against the 
rule. 
One must approach with caution an interpretive approach that singles out 
a particular religious segment of Utah society and interprets the Utah 
Constitution consistently with its views. The Utah Constitution was a product 
of cooperation among different religious traditions. Both Mormons and Gentiles 
alike drafted its provisions.329 If one gives dispositive weight to the views of the 
Mormon delegates in determining the intent of the Utah Constitutional 
Convention, how does one handle the opinions of Charles S. Varian, who 
apparently voted for article I, section 14? Varian aggressively prosecuted many 
polygamists,330 but was far and away the most active (and perhaps the most 
influential) of all of the delegates.331 
Moreover, several provisions in the Utah Constitution respond directly to the 
problems raised by the history of the polygamy prosecutions. While also 
specifically outlawing polygamy, Article EI of the Constitution provides directly 
that M[n]o inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in person or property 
on accoimt of his or her mode of religious worship . . . .*332 Article I, section 1 
affirms the "inherent and inalienable right" of all persons"to worship according 
to the dictates of their consciences . . . ." Article I, section 4 guarantees that 
"[t]he rights of conscience shall never be infringed" and that M[t]he State shall 
make no law. . . prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. Responding specifically 
to the federal practice of disqualifying Mormons from juries in polygamy 
trials,333 that section also provided "nor shall any person be incompetent as a 
witness or juror on accoimt of religious belief or the absence thereof." In answer 
to the federal practice of forcing polygamist wives to testify against their 
329. Stanley S. Ivins, A Constitution for Utah, 25 UTAH HIST. Q. 96,100 (1957) ("in line with the new 
political truce [between Utah Mormons and Gentiles], there were 28 non-Mormon delegates" of 107 delegates 
to the convention). 
330. Id. at 100; see DESERET NEWS, Jan. 27,1886, at 27 (describing prosecution by Varian). 
831. Ivins, tupra note 329, at 113-14; see also Another Busy Day, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 5, 1895, at 5. 
832. WaTfentine describes this provision as "unique*1 among the states "insofar as it proscribes 
disturbance of person or property." Wallentine, supra note 226, at 280. 
333. See FlRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 328, at 161, 165-66, 227-31. 
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husbands,834 article I, section 12 enshrined a constitutional marital testimonial 
privilege: W[A] wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a 
husband against his wife . . . . " Article III directs that "[p]erfect toleration of 
religious sentiment is guaranteed." Given these provisions, one hardly needs to 
pour concern about abusive polygamy prosecutions into the vessel of article I, 
section 14. The framers knew how to speak directly about the problems they had 
seen, and did so in these specific constitutional stipulations.335 
In addition, a careful reading of the historical record reveals that the 
Mormons were particularly disturbed by federal criminal prosecutions. The 
federal judicial machinery was responsible for enforcing anti-polygamy statutes 
and drew the ire of many of the citizens of Utah.336 Apart from the peculiar 
context of these religiously-influenced prosecutions dictated by politicians in 
Washington, D.C., nothing suggests that the framers of the Utah Constitution -
both Mormon and non-Mormon - intended to adopt provisions that would 
increase the burdens on their own state criminal justice system. The drafters of 
the Utah Constitution knew that with Utah's entry into the Union, the state's 
citizens would assume responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the 
criminal justice system and would soon need to prosecute crimes effectively. 
This sentiment is expressed, for instance, in a petition signed by 22,626 
women of Utah and sent to Congress in 1876: 
We ask to be relieved from the unjust and law-breaking officials forced 
upon us by the Government, and that we may have the jurisdiction of our own 
courts and the selection of our own officers, as we had in the past, when our 
cities were free from dram-shops, gambling-dens, and houses of infamy. As 
mothers and sisters, we earnestly appeal to you for help, that our sons may 
be saved from drunkenness and vice and our daughters from the power of the 
seducer . . . .S37 
Citizens concerned about ridding their cities of "dram-shops, gambling-dens, and 
houses of infamy" were not likely to make prosecution of those crimes more 
difficult.338 
334. Id. at 130, 138, 149-50, 163, 167, 194-97, 206-09. 
835. The delegates to the convention also were apparently aware of expansive protections of privacy in 
other state'constitutions but did not incorporate them into Utah's Constitution. See supra note 268 and 
accompanying text (discussing Washington protection of privacy). 
836. See FRMAGE & MANGKUM, supra note 328, at 147-48. 
337. A Petition of 22,626 Women of Utah, H i t Misc. Doc. No. 42 at 1-2, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876). 
838. See also Epistle of the First Presidency of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, in 
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